篇一：3000字英文翻译
Bolt Supporting of Large-Span Soft Rockway in
Shaqu Colliery
Abstract The instability of trapezoidal I-steel support is analysed for the compound roof of main coal seam in Shaqu Colliery, and the mechanism of bolt supporting is studied. A scheme of bolt supporting has been given and put into practice,remarkable technical and economic benefits have been got.
Key words :large-span,compound roof, bolt supporting, mechanism
1.Introduction
In shaqu colliery a large coal mine mining rare coking coal in China, most roadways are laid out in main coal seam
roof of coal seam .The soft compound ,which is composed of mudstone and coal seam
contains aboundant beddings and joints. The strength of the roof is so low that its uniaxial-saturated compressive strength is only 10.7 Mpa.RQD value of coal seam and is zero ,and that of mudstone is lower than 10%. There is clay minerals in mudstone, main compositions are interbedded strata of illite and montmorillonite which will swell when soaked by water, The span of preperation roadways and gateways is wider than 4m, and that of some main roadways is over 5m. In shaqu colliery , preperation roadways and gateways were supported by trapezoidal I-steel support, the beams of which were bent and damaged, and the roadways were destroyed seriously within a short period just after excavated. Roof
controlling of Large-Span Soft Rockways in the coal seam became the key to the production and construction of shaqu colliery.
2.supporting status and instability analysis of trapezoidal I-steel supports
trapezoidal I-steel supports were used in drawing roadways,which roof span is 4.0m, floor span is 4.9m, and hight 2.95m and spacing 0.5m. Initial resistance of the supports was almost zero because it was difficult to the support beams contact the roof, even if with high quality of installation. The trapezoidal I-steel supports would not carry load until the displacement of surrounding rock excceded 80-100 mm because the supports increased very slowly. Therefore, right after excavation, the roof would bend and subside severly. Eight hours after excavation, the roof strata would break completely, and then form rock cavity. The weight of caving rock would act on the beams of supports, which forms loose rock pressure.
By calculating, the ultimate load-bearing capacity is smaller than roof pressure whether it is uniformal or concentrated, Based on the in-situ observation, inflection value of most roof reached 200-300mm. When paired supports were used, paired beams were still bent and damaged; then midprops were added, they were also destroyed. Many roof beams were stabilized only if 2-3 props had been added. The supports were damaged completely, and most of them could not be reused. The part
section of roadways had become inverted trapezoid, and the available section was far smaller than the designed section. Part of roadways was out of use because it was in the danger of serious caving.
3.Mechanism of bolt supporting
Its mechanism is to make full use of the self-load-bearing capacity of surrounding rock by bolting, and then make the surrounding rock stabilize by itself. The stability of surrounding rock depends on the equilibrium status of ground pressure, self-load-bearing capacity of surrounding rock and anchoring force of bolts. Ground pressure is to make surrounding rock deform and break; self-load-bearing capacity is the main factor to stablize surrounding rock. Anchoring force of bolts can not change the equilibrium status of the three because it is very small, compared with ground pressure and self-load-bearing capacity. And its function is to change the decreasing regularity of self-load-bearing capacity versus the deformation of surrounding rock, and balance self-load-bearing capacity against ground pressure early.
Roof pressure is the pressure acting on the roof beams when I-steel supports are used to control the roof. When roof is supported by bolts, the roof pressure change to be the pressure acting on the rock within the bolting range because this part of rock is change into self-bearing body. According to the characteristics of the roof of coal seams
can be divided into six substrata. , bolts strata
When the value of roof subsidence is zero, roof pressure is in-situ stress; then roof pressure decreases with the increase of roof subsidence. The variation of roof pressure is analyzed by FLAC, The results are shown as curve 1 in Fig.1. Wheoof subsidence reaches 19 mm, the first roof substratum begins to bearing tensile stress, then losts self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to 0.67Mpa. When roof subsidence reaches 40 mm, the second substratum loses self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to 0.16Mpa. When roof subsidence reaches 100 mm, the fourth substratum loses self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to0.08Mpa. In the initial stage of roof subsidence, roof pressure decreases rapidly, and in the later stage of roof subsidence, roof pressure decreases slowly and then has an increasing trend.
The self-load-bearing capacity of the roof without bolting is calculated upon the theory of laminated beam, the result are shown as curve 2 in Fig.1. When roof subsidence is zero, the self-load-bearing capacity is at its utmost value 0.0625Mpa; when roof subsidence is 100mm,roof strata have broken, most of self-load-bearing capacity has lost, and the residual self-load-bearing capacity is only 0.0375Mpa.The self-load-bearing capacity of the roof with bolting is calculated upon the theory of combined beam, the result are shown as curve 3 in Fig.1. When roof subsidence is zero, the self-load-bearing capacity is at its utmost
value 0.4Mpa; when the roof subsidence reaches 40mm the self-load-bearing capacity decreases to 0.225Mpa,and when roof subsidence reaches 100mm, the self-load-bearing capacity decreases to 0.1Mpa .
As shown in Fin. 1, the self-load-bearing capacity of roof strata without bolting is lower than roof pressure during the whole course of roof subsiding, so roof strata cave inevitably. When bolted, roof strata is changed from laminated beam into combined beam ,and the selr-load-bearing capacity increases markedly. When roof subsidence reaches 44mm, the self-load-bearing capacity exceeds roof pressure, then roof strata stabilized by itself.
4 Anchoring technology
Based on the above study of bolting mechanism, large setting resistance, high speed of resistance and high final resistance are the key technology to the large-spon soft rock roadway before roof strata detaching, which includes: (1)to improve the setting resistance increasing and achieve high speed of resistance increasing, to make the real working properties of bolts coordinate self-load-bearing properties of roof strata , which enables to make full use of the self-load-bearing capacity of roof strata; (2)to raise bolting reliability, and solve the difficult problems that anchoring force between bolts and soft rock is small and easy to lose.
4.1 Bloting scheme
篇二：3000字英文参考文献及其翻译范例
3000字英文参考文献及其翻译
【注意：选用的英文一定要与自己的论文题目相关。
如果文章太长，可以节选（用省略号省略一些段略）。如果字数不够，可以选2至3篇，但要逐一注明详细出处。英文集中在一起放前面，对应的中文翻译放后面。中文翻译也要将出处翻译，除非是网页。 对文献的翻译一定要认真！对英文文献及其翻译的排版也要和论文正文一样！
特别注意：英文文献应该放在你的参考文献中。】
TOY RECALLS——IS CHINA THE PROBLEM？
Hari. Bapuji Paul W. Beamish
China exports about 20 billion toys per year and they are the second most commonly imported item by U.S. and Canada. It is estimated that about 10,000 factories in China manufacture toys for export. Considering this mutual dependence, it is important that the problems resulting in recalls are addressed carefully.
Although the largest portion of recalls by Mattel involved design flaws, the CEO of Mattel blamed the Chinese manufacturers by saying that the problem resulted ‘in this case （because） one of our
manufacturers did not follow the rules’. Several analysts too blamed the Chinese manufacturers. By placing blame where it did not belong, there is a danger of losing the opportunity to learn from the errors that have occurred. The first step to learn from errors is to know why and where the error occurred. Further, the most critical step in preventing the recurrence of errors is to find out what and who can prevent it.
……
From:http:///loadpage.aspx?Page=ShowDoc&CategoryAlias=zonghe/ggmflm_zh&BlockAlias=sjhwsd&filename=/doc/sjhwsd/200709281954.xml, Sep. 2007
玩具召回——是中国的问题吗？
哈里·巴普基 保罗·比密什
中国每年大约出口20亿美元的玩具，最常见是从美国和加拿大进口项目。据估计，中国大约有10000家玩具制造工厂从事玩具出口。考虑到这种相互依存，在召回时谨慎处理是很重要的。
尽管绝大部分美泰的玩具召回涉及设计缺陷，但是，美泰公司的首席执行官指责中国制造商说，导致这种问题的原因“是因为我们的一些制造商不遵守规则”。一些分析师也指责中国制造商。把责任归咎于不存在错误的地方是危险的行为，这将使得我们丧失从继有的错误中吸取教训的机会。第一步是要从错误中学习知道为什么发生错误和哪里发生了错误。此外，防止错误的再次发生最关键的一步是要找出什么以及谁可以阻止它。
??
来源：
http:///loadpage.aspx?Page=ShowDoc&CategoryAlias=zonghe/ggmflm_zh&BlockAlias=sjhwsd&filename=/doc/sjhwsd/200709281954.xml，2007年9月
篇三：金融学外文翻译3000汉字 中英对照
目 录
外文文献 .................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
2. Games and game theory ........................................................................................................ 2
3. Theories of social preferences ............................................................................................... 3
4. Why do game experiments? And which games?................................................................... 3
5. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 4
中文翻译 .................................................................................................... 4
1.摘要....................................................................................................................................... 5
2.博弈和博弈论 ....................................................................................................................... 5
3.社会偏好理论 ....................................................................................................................... 6
4.为什么用博弈做实验？用什么博弈？ ............................................................................... 6
5. 结论 ..................................................................................................................................... 6
外文文献
Measuring Social Norms and Preferences using
Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists Colin F.
Camerer and Ernst Fehr
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a menu of experimental games that are useful for measuring aspects of social norms and social preferences. Economists use the term “preferences” to refer to the choices people make, and particularly to tradeoffs between different collections (“bundles”) of things they value—food, money, time, prestige, and so forth. “Social preferences” refer to how people rank different allocations of material payoffs to themselves and others. Self-interested individuals care only about their own material payoffs. The past two decades of experimental research have shown, however, that a substantial fraction of people in developed countries (typically college students) also care about the payoffs of others. In some situations, many people are willing to spend resources to reduce the payoff of others. In other situations, the same people spend resources to increase the payoff of others.
As we will see, the willingness to reduce or increase the payoff of relevant reference actors exists even though people reap neither present nor future material rewards from reducing or increasing payoffs of others. This indicates that, in addition to
self-interested behavior, people sometimes behave as if they have altruistic preferences, and preferences for equality and reciprocity.1 Reciprocity, as we define it here, is different from the notion of reciprocal altruism in evolutionary biology. Reciprocity means that people are willing to reward friendly actions and to punish hostile actionsalthough the reward or punishment causes a net reduction in the material payoff of those who reward or punish. Similarly, people who dislike inequality are willing to take costly actions to reduce inequality although this may result in a net reduction of their material payoff. Reciprocal altruism typically assumes that reciprocation yields a net increase in the material payoff (for example, because one player’s action earns them a reputation which benefits them in the future). Altruism, as we define it here, means that an actor takes costly actions to increase the payoff of another actor, irrespective of the other actor’s previous actions. Altruism thus represents unconditional kindness while reciprocity means non-selfish behavior that is conditioned on the previous actions of the other actor.
Reciprocity, inequality aversion and altruism can have large effects on the regularities of social life and, in particular, on the enforcement of social norms. This is why the examination of the nature of social preferences is so important for anthropology and for social sciences in general. There is, for example, an ongoing debate in anthropology about the reasons for food-sharing in small-scale societies. The nature of social preferences will probably have a large effect on the social mechanism that sustains food-sharing. For example, if many people in a society exhibit inequality aversion or reciprocity, they will be willing to punish those who do not share food, so no formal mechanism is needed to govern food-sharing. Without such preferences, formal mechanisms are needed to sustain food-sharing (or sharing does not occur at all). As we will see there are simple games that allow researchers to find out whether there are norms of food-sharing, and punishment of those who do not share.
In the following we first sketch game theory in broad terms. Then we describe some basic features of experimental design in economics. Then we introduce a menu of seven games that have proved useful in examining social preferences. We define the games formally, show what aspects of social life they express, and describe behavioral regularities from experimental studies. The behavioral regularities are then interpreted in terms of preferences for reciprocity, inequity aversion or altruism. The final sections describe some other games anthropologists might find useful, and draw conclusions.
2. Games and game theory
Game theory is a mathematical language for describing strategic interactions and their likely outcomes. A game is a set of strategies for each of several players, with precise rules for the order in which players choose strategies, the information they have when they choose, and how they rate the desirability (``utility") of resulting outcomes. Game theory is designed to be flexible enough to be used at many levels of detail in a broad range of sciences. Players may be genes, people, groups, firms or nation-states. Strategies may be genetically-coded instincts, heuristics for bidding on the e-Bay website, corporate routines for developing and introducing new products, a legal strategy in complex mass tort cases, or wartime battle plans. Outcomes can be anything players value-- prestige, food, control of Congress, sexual opportunity, returning a tennis serve,
corporate profits, the gap between what you would maximally pay for something and what you actually pay (“consumer surplus”), a sense of justice, or captured territory.
Game theory consists of two different enterprises: (1) Using games as a language or taxonomy to parse the social world; and (2) deriving precise predictions about how players will play in a game by assuming that players maximize expected “utility” (personal valuation) of consequences, plan ahead, and form beliefs about other players' likely actions. The second enterprise dominates game theory textbooks and journals. Analytical theory of this sort is extremely mathematical, and inaccessible to many social scientists outside of economics and theoretical biology. Fortunately, games can be used as a taxonomy with minimal mathematics because understanding prototypical games— like those discussed in this chapter— requires nothing beyond simple logic.
The most central concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies (one for each player) form an equilibrium if each player is choosing the strategy which is a best response (i.e., gives the highest expected utility) to the other players’ strategies. Attention is focussed on equilibrium because players who are constantly switching to better strategies, given what others have done, will generally end up at an equilibrium. Increasingly, game theorists are interested in the dynamics of equilibration as well, in the form of evolution of populations of player strategies (Weibull, 1995); or learning by individuals from experience (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999).
3. Theories of social preferences
Within economics, the leading explanation for the patterns of results described above is that agents have social preferences (or “social utility”) which take into account the payoffs and perhaps intentions of others. Roughly speaking, social preference theories assume that people have stable preferences for how money is allocated (which may depend on who the other player is, or how the allocation came about), much as they are assumed in economics to have preferences for food, the present versus the future, how close their house is to work, and so forth.10
Cultural anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists have sought to explain the origin of these preferences. One idea is that in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) or ancestral past, people mostly engaged in repeated games with people they knew. Evolution created specialized cognitive heuristics for playing repeated games efficiently. It is well-known in game theory that behavior which is optimal for a selfinterested actor in a one-period game with a stranger - such as defecting or free riding, accepting all ultimatum offers - is not always optimal in repeated games with partners. In a repeated ultimatum game, for example, it pays to reject offers to build up a reputation for being hard to push around, which leads to more generous offers in the future. In the unnatural habitat view, subjects cannot “turn off” the habitual behavior shaped by repeated-game life in the EEA when they play single games with strangers in the lab. An important modification of this view is that evolution did not equip all people with identical hard-wired instincts for playing games, but instead created the capacity for learning social norms. The latter view can explain why different cultures would have different norms.
4. Why do game experiments? And which games?
A central advantage of experimental games is comparability across subject pools (provided great care is taken in controlling for differences in language, purchasing power of outcomes, interactions with experimenters, and so forth). While comparability is clearly not perfect, it is surely as good as most qualitative measures. A further advantage is replicability. The fact that experiments are replicable is a powerful tool for creating consensus about the fact and their interpretation in the scientific community.
In fact, experiments conducted in the field by anthropologists may actually have two large advantages compared to lab experiments in Western countries which usually (though not always) use college students as experimental subjects. First, since anthropologists are in the field for long periods of time, the cost of collecting data is rather low. (Most contributors to this volume often noted that the experiment was unusually fun for participants, probably more so than for college students raised in a world of Nintendo, 500-channel cable TV, and web surfing.) Second, the amount of funds budgeted by granting agencies in developed countries for subject payments typically have extraordinary purchasing power in primitive societies. As a result, it is easy for anthropologists to test whether people behave differently for very large stakes, such as a week or month of wages, compared to low stakes. Such comparisons are important for generalizing to high-stakes economic activity, but are often prohibitively expensive in developed countries.
5. Conclusions
Game theory has proved useful in a wide range of social sciences in two ways: By providing a taxonomy of social situations which parse the social world; and by making precise predictions about how self-interested players will actually play. Behavior in experiments which carefully control players’ strategies, information, and possible payoffs shows that actual choices often deviate systematically from the game-theoretic prediction based on self-interest. These deviations are naturally interpreted as evidence of social norms (what players expect and feel obliged to do) and social preferences (how players feel when others earn more or less money). This evidence is now being used actively by economists to craft a parsimonious theory of social preferences which can be used to explain data from many different games in a simple way that makes fresh predictions. Since anthropologists are often interested in how social norms and preferences emerge, evolve, and vary across cultures, these games could provide a powerful tool for doing empirical anthropology. In addition to measuring social preferences and social norms experimental games may also be used for measuring moral authority, players beliefs about other players’ actions in coordination games, cultural homogeneity and status effects in bargaining.
中文翻译
测量社会规范和偏好使用的博弈实验：对社会科学家的指导
Colin F. Camerer and Ernst Fehr
1.摘要
本章的目的是描述一个能有效测量社会规范和社会偏好的博弈。经济学家使用术语“偏好”来表达人们的选择，特别是在不同的集合（“束”）例如食品，金钱，时间，声誉的事情，等等中他们的权衡。“社会偏好”指的是人们如何排序物质回报给自己和别人不同的分配。自私自利的人只关心自己的物质回报。过去二十年的博弈实验研究表明，实际上，发达国家的相当大的一部分人（通常是大学生）也关心他人的回报。在某些情况下，许多人愿意花费资源减少别人的回报。在其他情况下，这些人花费资源来增加别人的回报。
正如我们将看到的，即使减少或增加他人的报酬不影响自身现在或未来得到的报酬，减少或增加相关参与者报酬的意愿仍然存在。这表明，除了自我感兴趣的行为，人们有时表现得好像他们有利他偏好，并追求平等和互惠。互惠，我们在这里的定义，不同于在进化生物学的互惠利他主义的概念。互惠意味着人们愿意奖赏友好的行为和惩罚不利的行动，即使奖励或惩罚导致实施奖励或惩罚的人的物质报酬净减少。同样的，那些不喜欢不平等的人愿意采取代价高昂的行动来减少不平等虽然这可能会导致他们的物质回报净减少。互惠利他主义通常假设往复运动产生的净增长使物质回报增加（例如，因为一个参与者的行动赢得了声誉使他们在未来受益）。利他主义，在这里的定义，意味着一个参与者采取代价高昂的行动来增加另一个参与者的回报而不管其他参与者的历史行为。利他主义是无私的奉献，而互惠意味着以其他参与者的历史行为为条件的非自利行为。
互惠，不平等厌恶和利他主义对社会生活的规律影响很大，特别是对社会规范的执行。这就是为什么社会偏好的本质的考察通常是非常重要的人类学和社会科学。例如有一个关于人类学中小规模社会分享食物的原因的正在进行的辩论。社会偏好的性质可能将对维持共享食物的社会机制产生很大影响。例如，如果许多人在一个社会中表现出不平等厌恶或互惠，他们将有意愿去惩罚那些不愿意分享失误的人，因此没有正式的机制来管理食品共享。没有这样的偏好，就需要正式的机制来维持分享食物（或者共享根本不存在）。正如我们将看到的一些简单的实验，来让研究人员找出是否有食品共享的规范，和对那些不分享的人惩罚。
接下来我们首先在广泛的术语中草拟理论。然后我们描述经济学实验设计的一些基本特征。然后，我们介绍一系列在研究社会偏好中被证明是有用的的七个博弈。我们正式定义那些实验，展示他们表示的社会生活的方方面面，描述从实验研究中得出的行为规律。行为规律在随后的偏好互惠利他主义中被解释为不公平厌恶或利他主义。最后的部分描述了一些其他的人类学家可能会发现有用并得出结论的博弈。
2.博弈和博弈论
博弈论是描述战略的相互作用及其可能的结果的一种数学语言。博弈是每个参与者的决策的集，在参与者选择决策时有精确的规则，他们选择时拥有的信息，和他们如何估计由此产生的结果的期望（效用）。博弈论可以灵活的在许多细节层次的学科范围广泛使用。参与者可以是基因，人，团体，企业或国家。策略可能是基因编码的本能，在拍卖网站竞标的启发式算法，为新产品开发企业的例程，在复杂的大规模侵权案件的法律策略，或战时作战计划。结果可以是任何参与者衡量的价值——信誉，食品，对国会的控制，性机会，返回一个网球发球，企业利润，你会最大限度地付出的东西和你实际支付之间的差距，（消费者剩余），正义感，或捕获的领土。
博弈论由两个不同理论组成：（1）使用博弈作为一种语言或分类来解析社会；（2）通过假设参与者最大化预期“效用”（自我价值）的重要性获得关于参与者如何进行一次博弈的精确预测，预先计划，并形成对其他参与者类似行为的猜想。第二理论主导博弈论教科书和期刊。这种分析理论是完全的数学化，并且无法联系许多经济学和生物学理论之外的社会科学。幸运的是，由于了解典型的博弈——像那些在本章讨论的——没有超出简单的逻辑的
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