3000字英译汉

篇一：3000字英文翻译

Bolt Supporting of Large-Span Soft Rockway in

Shaqu Colliery

Abstract The instability of trapezoidal I-steel support is analysed for the compound roof of main coal seam in Shaqu Colliery, and the mechanism of bolt supporting is studied. A scheme of bolt supporting has been given and put into practice,remarkable technical and economic benefits have been got.

Key words :large-span,compound roof, bolt supporting, mechanism

1.Introduction

In shaqu colliery a large coal mine mining rare coking coal in China, most roadways are laid out in main coal seam

roof of coal seam .The soft compound ,which is composed of mudstone and coal seam

contains aboundant beddings and joints. The strength of the roof is so low that its uniaxial-saturated compressive strength is only 10.7 Mpa.RQD value of coal seam and is zero ,and that of mudstone is lower than 10%. There is clay minerals in mudstone, main compositions are interbedded strata of illite and montmorillonite which will swell when soaked by water, The span of preperation roadways and gateways is wider than 4m, and that of some main roadways is over 5m. In shaqu colliery , preperation roadways and gateways were supported by trapezoidal I-steel support, the beams of which were bent and damaged, and the roadways were destroyed seriously within a short period just after excavated. Roof

controlling of Large-Span Soft Rockways in the coal seam became the key to the production and construction of shaqu colliery.

2.supporting status and instability analysis of trapezoidal I-steel supports

trapezoidal I-steel supports were used in drawing roadways,which roof span is 4.0m, floor span is 4.9m, and hight 2.95m and spacing 0.5m. Initial resistance of the supports was almost zero because it was difficult to the support beams contact the roof, even if with high quality of installation. The trapezoidal I-steel supports would not carry load until the displacement of surrounding rock excceded 80-100 mm because the supports increased very slowly. Therefore, right after excavation, the roof would bend and subside severly. Eight hours after excavation, the roof strata would break completely, and then form rock cavity. The weight of caving rock would act on the beams of supports, which forms loose rock pressure.

By calculating, the ultimate load-bearing capacity is smaller than roof pressure whether it is uniformal or concentrated, Based on the in-situ observation, inflection value of most roof reached 200-300mm. When paired supports were used, paired beams were still bent and damaged; then midprops were added, they were also destroyed. Many roof beams were stabilized only if 2-3 props had been added. The supports were damaged completely, and most of them could not be reused. The part

section of roadways had become inverted trapezoid, and the available section was far smaller than the designed section. Part of roadways was out of use because it was in the danger of serious caving.

3.Mechanism of bolt supporting

Its mechanism is to make full use of the self-load-bearing capacity of surrounding rock by bolting, and then make the surrounding rock stabilize by itself. The stability of surrounding rock depends on the equilibrium status of ground pressure, self-load-bearing capacity of surrounding rock and anchoring force of bolts. Ground pressure is to make surrounding rock deform and break; self-load-bearing capacity is the main factor to stablize surrounding rock. Anchoring force of bolts can not change the equilibrium status of the three because it is very small, compared with ground pressure and self-load-bearing capacity. And its function is to change the decreasing regularity of self-load-bearing capacity versus the deformation of surrounding rock, and balance self-load-bearing capacity against ground pressure early.

Roof pressure is the pressure acting on the roof beams when I-steel supports are used to control the roof. When roof is supported by bolts, the roof pressure change to be the pressure acting on the rock within the bolting range because this part of rock is change into self-bearing body. According to the characteristics of the roof of coal seams

can be divided into six substrata. , bolts strata

When the value of roof subsidence is zero, roof pressure is in-situ stress; then roof pressure decreases with the increase of roof subsidence. The variation of roof pressure is analyzed by FLAC, The results are shown as curve 1 in Fig.1. Wheoof subsidence reaches 19 mm, the first roof substratum begins to bearing tensile stress, then losts self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to 0.67Mpa. When roof subsidence reaches 40 mm, the second substratum loses self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to 0.16Mpa. When roof subsidence reaches 100 mm, the fourth substratum loses self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to0.08Mpa. In the initial stage of roof subsidence, roof pressure decreases rapidly, and in the later stage of roof subsidence, roof pressure decreases slowly and then has an increasing trend.

The self-load-bearing capacity of the roof without bolting is calculated upon the theory of laminated beam, the result are shown as curve 2 in Fig.1. When roof subsidence is zero, the self-load-bearing capacity is at its utmost value 0.0625Mpa; when roof subsidence is 100mm,roof strata have broken, most of self-load-bearing capacity has lost, and the residual self-load-bearing capacity is only 0.0375Mpa.The self-load-bearing capacity of the roof with bolting is calculated upon the theory of combined beam, the result are shown as curve 3 in Fig.1. When roof subsidence is zero, the self-load-bearing capacity is at its utmost

value 0.4Mpa; when the roof subsidence reaches 40mm the self-load-bearing capacity decreases to 0.225Mpa,and when roof subsidence reaches 100mm, the self-load-bearing capacity decreases to 0.1Mpa .

As shown in Fin. 1, the self-load-bearing capacity of roof strata without bolting is lower than roof pressure during the whole course of roof subsiding, so roof strata cave inevitably. When bolted, roof strata is changed from laminated beam into combined beam ,and the selr-load-bearing capacity increases markedly. When roof subsidence reaches 44mm, the self-load-bearing capacity exceeds roof pressure, then roof strata stabilized by itself.

4 Anchoring technology

Based on the above study of bolting mechanism, large setting resistance, high speed of resistance and high final resistance are the key technology to the large-spon soft rock roadway before roof strata detaching, which includes: (1)to improve the setting resistance increasing and achieve high speed of resistance increasing, to make the real working properties of bolts coordinate self-load-bearing properties of roof strata , which enables to make full use of the self-load-bearing capacity of roof strata; (2)to raise bolting reliability, and solve the difficult problems that anchoring force between bolts and soft rock is small and easy to lose.

4.1 Bloting scheme

篇二：英译汉3000字 毕业设计(电子)

Integrated Circuits

The Integrated Circuit

Digital logic and electronic circuits derive their functionality from electronic switches called transistor. Roughly speaking, the transistor can be likened to an electronically controlled valve whereby energy applied to one connection of the valve enables energy to flow between two other connections.By combining multiple transistors, digital logic building blocks such as AND gates and flip-flops are formed. Transistors, in turn, are made from semiconductors. Consult a periodic table of elements in a college chemistry textbook, and you will locate semiconductors as a group of elements separating the metals and nonmetals.They are called semiconductors because of their ability to behave as both metals and nonmetals. A semiconductor can be made to conduct electricity like a metal or to insulate as a nonmetal does. These differing electrical properties can be accurately controlled by mixing the semiconductor with small amounts of other elements. This mixing is called doping. A semiconductor can be doped to contain more electrons (N-type) or fewer electrons (P-type). Examples of commonly used semiconductors are silicon and germanium. Phosphorous and boron are two elements that are used to dope N-type and P-type silicon, respectively.

A transistor is constructed by creating a sandwich of differently doped semiconductor layers. The two most common types of transistors, the

bipolar-junction transistor (BJT) and the field-effect transistor (FET) are schematically illustrated in Figure 2.1.This figure shows both the silicon structures of these elements and their graphical symbolic representation as would be seen in a circuit diagram. The BJT shown is an NPN transistor, because it is composed of a sandwich of N-P-N doped silicon. When a small current is injected into the base terminal, a larger current is enabled to flow from the collector to the emitter.The FET shown is an N-channel FET, which is composed of two N-type regions separated by a P-type substrate. When a voltage is applied to the insulated gate terminal, a current is enabled to flow from the drain to the source. It is called N-channel, because the gate voltage induces an N-channel within the substrate, enabling current to flow between the N-regions.

Another basic semiconductor structure is a diode, which is formed simply by a junction of N-type and P-type silicon. Diodes act like one-way valves by conducting current only from P to N. Special diodes can be created that emit light when a voltage is applied. Appropriately enough, these components are called light emitting diodes, or LEDs. These small lights are manufactured by the millions and are found in diverse applications from telephones to traffic lights.

The resulting small chip of semiconductor material on which a transistor or diode is fabricated can be encased in a small plastic package for protection against damage and contamination from the out-side world.Small

wires are connected within this package between the semiconductor sandwich and pins that protrude from the package to make electrical contact with other parts of the intended circuit. Once you have several discrete transistors, digital logic can be built by directly wiring these components together. The circuit will function, but any substantial amount of digital logic will be very bulky, because several transistors are required to implement each of the various types of logic gates.

At the time of the invention of the transistor in 1947 by John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley, the only way to assemble multiple transistors into a single circuit was to buy separate discrete transistors and wire them together. In 1959, Jack Kilby and Robert Noyce independently invented a means of fabricating multiple transistors on a single slab of semiconductor material. Their invention would come to be known as the integrated circuit, or IC, which is the foundation of our modern computerized world. An IC is so called because it integrates multiple transistors and diodes onto the same small semiconductor chip. Instead of having to solder individual wires between discrete components, an IC contains many small components that are already wired together in the desired topology to form a circuit.

A typical IC, without its plastic or ceramic package, is a square or rectangular silicon die measuring from 2 to 15 mm on an edge. Depending on the level of technology used to manufacture the IC, there may be anywhere from a dozen to tens of millions of individual transistors on this small chip. This

amazing density of electronic components indicates that the transistors and the wires that connect them are extremely small in size. Dimensions on an IC are measured in units of micrometers, with one micrometer (1mm) being one millionth of a meter. To serve as a reference point, a human hair is roughly 100mm in diameter. Some modern ICs contain components and wires that are measured in increments as small as 0.1mm! Each year, researchers and engineers have been finding new ways to steadily reduce these feature sizes to pack more transistors into the same silicon area, as indicated in Figure 2.2.

When an IC is designed and fabricated, it generally follows one of two main transistor technologies: bipolar or metal-oxide semiconductor (MOS). Bipolar processes create BJTs, whereas MOS processes create FETs. Bipolar logic was more common before the 1980s, but MOS technologies have since accounted the great majority of digital logic ICs. N-channel FETs are fabricated in an NMOS process, and P-channel FETs are fabricated in a PMOS process. In the 1980s, complementary-MOS, or CMOS, became the dominant process technology and remains so to this day. CMOS ICs incorporate both NMOS and PMOS transistors.

集成电路

集成电路

数字逻辑和电子电路由称为晶体管的电子开关得到它们的（各种）功能。粗略地说，晶体管好似一种电子控制阀，由此加在阀一端的能量可以使能量在另外两个连接端之间流动。通过多个晶体管的组合就可以构成数字逻辑模块，如与门和触发电路等。而晶体管是由半导体构成的。查阅大学化学书中的元素周期表，你会查到半导体是介于金属与非金属之间的一类元素。它们之所以被叫做半导体是由于它们表现出来的性质类似于金属和非金属。可使半导体像金属那样导电，或者像非金属那样绝缘。通过半导体和少量其它元素的混合可以精确地控制这些不同的电特性，这种混合技术称之为“半导体掺杂”。半导体通过掺杂可以包含更多的电子（N型）或更少的电子（P型）。常用的半导体是硅和锗，N型硅半导体掺入磷元素，而P型硅半导体掺入硼元素。

不同掺杂的半导体层形成的三明治状夹层结构可以构成一个晶体管，最常见的两类晶体管是双极型晶体管（BJT）和场效应晶体管（FET），图2.1给出了它们的图示。图中给出了这些晶体管的硅结构，以及它们用于电路图中的符号。BJT是NPN晶体管，因为由N—P—N掺杂硅三层构成。当小电流注入基极时，可使较大的电流从集电极流向发射极。图示的FET是N沟道的场效应型晶体管，它由两块被P型基底分离的N型组成。将电压加在绝缘的栅极上时，可使电流由漏极流向源极。它被叫做N沟道是因为栅极电压诱导基底上的N通道，使电流能在两个N区域之间流动。

另一个基本的半导体结构是二极管，由N型和P型硅连接而成的结组成。二极管的作用就像一个单向阀门，由于电流只能从P流向N。可以构建一些特殊二极管，在加电压时可以发光，这些器件非常合适地被叫做发光二极管或LED。这种小灯泡数以百万计地被制造出来，有各种各样的应用，从电话机到交通灯。

半导体材料上制作晶体管或二极管所形成的小芯片用塑料封装以防损伤和被外界污染。在这封装里一些短线连接半导体夹层和从封装内伸出的插脚以便与（使用该晶体管的）电路其余部分连接。一旦你有了一些分立的晶体管，直接用电线将这些器件连线在一起就可以构建数字逻辑（电路）。电路会工作，但任何实质性的数字逻辑（电路）都将十分庞大，因为要在各种逻辑门中每实现一种都需要多个晶体管。

1947年，John Bardeen、Walter Brattain和and William Shockley发明晶体管

篇三：3000字翻译

Monetary policy

An unfinished revolution

Aug 9th 2013, 12:53 by R.A. | LONDON

PROGRESS in the practice of monetary policy occurs one disaster at a time. From the depression of the 1930s economists learned that money matters, and that a contraction in the money supply can produce a painful downturn. From the inflation of the 1970s economists learned that inflation is a monetary phenomenon which can be controlled through the proper application of monetary policy. One has the sense that altough the world's present disaster is coming—slowly, fitfully—to an end, central bankers are still quite a long way away from understanding how they failed and how they might do better in the future. The most recent moves from the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve suggest that this particular revolution remains unfinished.

Monetary lessons are never learned quickly—unfortunately, since an earlier understanding of the nature of the disasters might allow policymakers to change course more quickly and prevent a lot of human suffering. Governments began experimenting with reinflation in 1932-33, touching off a proper recovery after four long years of depression, but America blundered back into recession in 1937 after tightening monetary policy once again. Only when monetary policy was entirely subordinated to the war effort was the depression well and truly beaten. And only in the decades after the war would economists begin articulating the connection between monetary contraction, deflation, and depression; Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's "Monetary History of the United States" was not published until 1963.

Inflation began its long march upwards in the mid-1960s and raged in double digits, across the rich world, for much of the 1970s. Not until the early 1980s did governments begin wringing inflation out of the system through monetary tightening. In that case, the intellectual heavy lifting preceded the policy experimentation. Monetarists and rational expectations theorists had ready explanations for galloping inflation, but central bankers took convincing that hammering economies with tighter policy would make a difference. The world's most recent economic disaster began in the late 1990s, when the Japanese economy fell into a liquidity trap and embarked on its lost decade. Economists quickly set to work diagnosing the Japanese economy and building policy recommendations. But arguments over just what Japan's crisis meant were uesolved when a Japan-like disaster descended on much of the rest of the rich world. And central banks have only gingerly and belatedly begun trying out ideas meant to bring the crisis to a quick and definitive end.

The rich world's disaster hinges on the problem of zero, in two ways. First, as the interest rates under the control of the central bank approach zero, policymakers are at a loss as to how to continue loosening policy. And second, when inflation approaches zero the

relationship between economic weakness and disinflation breaks down. When inflation is high a surge in unemployment will quickly slow price increases, but when inflation is low wage and price rigidities blunt the effect of unemployment, leaving inflation targeting central banks uncertain how to proceed.

These puzzles provoked an ongoing debate. In one corner stands a group with a long and proud history: those ready to give up on monetary policy. Some have been in the corner since rates first touched zero in 2008 while others have joined over time as unconventional policies failed to bring back full employment. But like those who said monetary policy couldn't fix the depression or rein in inflation, this bunch reckons that zero means it's time for other strategies, or to simply accept present suffering.

In another corner there are the mechanics, who reckon central banks have their framework right and only need to find new tools. If inflation falls dangerously below target while the main policy rate is near zero, then one should simply target longer rates and bring them down to zero. If even more oomph is needed, then the central bank can turn to rates on private (rather than government) loans and securities, and drive them down to zero. This group won the day in Japan, where the central bank debuted "quantitative easing" in the early 2000s. It held the early edge elsewhere in the rich world in the aftermath of the Great Recession; both the Fed and the Bank of England reached for 量化宽松政策 after their benchmark rates dropped to near zero.

Then there are those who emphasise expectations. It is not a controversial statement in central banking to note that the stance of monetary policy is determined by expectations of how a central bank will react to changing economic circumstances. But that of course implies that by telling markets about what sorts of things will trigger rate increases in the future, a central bank can tighten or loosen monetary policy in the present, all without adjusting any inerest rates. So if markets are behaving—that is, saving, borrowing, and investing—as if the central bank is likely to start tightening when x, y, and z thresholds are crossed, and the central bank then says to markets that it is actually prepared to allow expansion beyond those thresholds before raising rates, then markets should change their behaviour immediately.

This bunch has been ascendent over the past two years. Beginning in 2011 Federal Reserve policy statements included an approximate calendar date on which interest rates would begin to rise; in August of 2011 rates were said to be likely to stay low until at least mid-2013. For the next year the Fed adjusted its calendar guidance in response to economic conditions. Then in December of last year it switched things up, changing its guidance to revolve around economic variables, namely, the level of unemployment and inflation. Rates would stay low, the Fed said, until the unemployment rate had fallen to at least 6.5%, provided that inflation expectations were no more than half a percentage point above the Fed's 2% target. Fed officials have since indicated that ongoing 量化宽松政策 will also be pegged to particular changes in the economy, timed to end as the unemployment rate falls to 7%. This week the Bank of England embraced a similar approach. The Bank's main policy rate will not rise and 量化宽松政策 will continue until

the unemployment rate has fallen to at least 7%, provided that inflation two years ahead is not expected to be more than half a percentage point above 2% and the financial system is not judged to be tilting toward instability.

The expectations crowd seems to have gained an edge among policymakers for a few different reasons. First, central bank assessments of the risk-return profile of 量化宽松政策 seem to have been worsening. Central bankers never seemed particularly comfortable splashing out on government bonds, but appear to have been less than impressed with the results of their purchases and sick of hearing complaints about unpleasant 量化宽松政策 side effects (real and imagined), from financial-system distortions to looming hyperinflation. Some may also have worried that in the absence of clear communication about future policy 量化宽松政策's effects were being blunted. Markets might react to expansionary 量化宽松政策 by simply moving forward the date on which they expected policy tightening, thereby cancelling out the good done by the asset purchases. Better expectations management could help secure some of the 量化宽松政策 gains. And lastly, the thresholds approached has given hawkish central bankers an exit strategy to cling to: a sense that all the largesse will end, and perhaps in the not-too-distant future.

But the Fed has been tinkering with expectations management for a while now without generating the rapid recovery one would hope for from appropriate monetary policy. While the Bank of England approved of the Fed's innovations enough to adopt them for its own, Governor Mark Carney seemed to go out of his way to warn not to expect too much from the new guidance.

And yet the sun has yet to shine on those lingering in the last corner, who suggest that maybe there is something slightly more fundamental amiss with the current monetary policy approach: namely, that it still has a 2% inflation target at its heart.

That a 2% inflation goal might be a major culprit in the rich world's current economic mess is a hard thing to stomach for economists and policymakers who came of age in the 1970s. Yet there are good reasons for fingering the 2% rate as a real problem. Troubles began before the crisis, as the near-total absence of inflation pressure helped usher interest rates steadily downward, leaving much less breathing space between the Fed's policy rate and the dread zero. The Fed's main policy rate was just 4.25% when the recession began, giving the central bank little room to cut rates to battle the downturn. Economists have had to raise their estimates of just how often an economy will end up stuck with interest rates near zero when central banks target low rates of inflation.

A second difficulty emerged soon after: low and stable inflation translates into very rigid wages and prices, even in the face of big declines in demand and soaring unemployment. When the variability of inflation drops (as it did, dramatically, from the early 1980s on) workers and firms get in the habit of adjusting prices less frequently, they drop automatic wage indexing, and they generally increase the rigidity of the economy-wide price level. This rigidity is especially problematic at near-zero inflation rates given resistance to accepting absolute cuts in wages and prices. As a result even the epic economic collapse of late 2008 and early 2009 translated into relatively moderate and delayed disinflation.

And that meant big trouble for economies in which central banks used deflation as their depression canary-in-a-coal-mine. Prior to the crisis many central bankers would have insisted that there could be no demand collapse if inflation were kept above 1% and that keeping inflation above 1% would be sufficient to prevent a demand collapse. But they were wrong.

And though the link between sufficient demand and stable inflation would seem to have been called into question, central bankers have yet to update their mental models accordingly. They have evolved a bit. As the shift toward dual thresholds, including unemployment as well as inflation, indicates, central bankers are recognising that there is information out there about demand than is contained in the inflation rate. And yet their evolution is incomplete, because they insist on targeting a higher level of demand subject to continued fidelity to the inflation target. They have given themselves a bit of wiggle room by saying they will tolerate expected inflation a shade above 2%. But what they have manifestly not done is declare that they want more demand, whether or not that happens to involve inflation sustained above 2%.

Within the pre-crisis policy paradigm that view makes perfect sense. Rising inflation, in that worldview, is a sign that the economy is approaching its structural limits: is growing as fast as it potentially can. Goosing demand over and above that level is worse than useless; any growth that results is unsustainable and will fuel accelerating inflation.

But the crisis ought to have led central bankers to reconsider this view. For one thing, as noted above, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is not as clear as one would think at very low inflation rates. Study after study, including many produced by Fed economists, indicates that most of the gap between the current unemployment rate and the "normal" level is temporary—there really is quite a lot of labour-market slack—and yet inflation is not much below target. If inflation is less informative about slack than it used to be, then a central bank interested in getting rid of slack should probably discount the inflation signal to some extent.

Or to put things somewhat differently, an inflation rate of 3% or 4% is not in and of itself dangerous. It could be worrisome if it seemed to signal an economy being pushed beyond its capacity. But if there is good reason to believe that the economy is not close to capacity, then there is no particular reason to fear 3% inflation or 4% inflation. Inflation accelerating from 3% through 4% and beyond yes, but of all the problems rich economies have had over the past half decade turning a rising inflation rate to a falling one has not been among them.

It is worth acknowledging that there can be costs to a high but stable rate of inflation relative to a low but stable rate. If some prices adjust less quickly or easily than others, then a higher rate of inflation may entail greater distortions in relative prices that entail some efficiency costs. Such things need to be kept in perspective, however. The American economy, for instance, has been operating with an output gap close to $1 trillion for half a decade now. Even if that estimate is wildly overstated, and the actual gap is closer to $200 billion or 1.3% of GDP, that cost probably swamps any damage from relative-price

distortions.

Neither is the relationship between slack and inflation the only thing to consider. With interest rates near zero it may be very difficult to raise demand without lifting inflation expectations above the 2% rate. Normal monetary policy operates on the principle that there is a "market clearing" real interest rate (or set of real market rates), that balances desired saving and desired borrowing and prevents resources—or willing workers—from sitting around idle. The central bank's normal goal, then, is to adjust its policy rate to nudge market rates toward that market-clearing level. But what if the market-clearing real policy rate is -3% and the actual policy rate is stuck at 0.5% while inflation is just 1.5%? In that case the central bank's policy rate is way too high, and will remain way too high until either the market-clearing rate moves back toward positive territory or the central bank makes up its mind to lift inflation expectations. With an expected inflation rate of 3.5% the real policy rate drops to the appropriate level and the economy should leap in response. But that may seem an unlikely story. Or one could simply wonder about the underlying health of an economy in which investors can't find any attractive positive-return investments and must be cajoled into splashing out by the threat of inflation-driven loss of principal. The simpler way to conceptualise the current situation may simply be to conclude that inflation isn't as meaningful a concept as we thought. If we're interested in demand, and the reason we're interested in demand is that too much of it causes accelerating price increases and too little of it causes unnecessary joblessness, and we're pretty certain that there is too little demand despite the fact that the our traditional metric for assessing demand is signalling that all is well...well, perhaps that traditional metric isn't useful anymore, at least not for assessing demand.

One would then need an alternative metric, which of course takes us to the nominal output brigade. Nominal GDP, or total spending or income in the economy in dollar terms, has long been one of the gauges on the central banker's dashboard. It is hard to think of a better measure of economy-wide demand than the total amount of money spent each year in dollar terms. Supporters of an NGDP target (either a rate of growth or a trend level) point to several advantages. One, which should be clear already, is that there is little risk of monetary policy fumbling situations like the present in which demand swings are not entirely reflected in changes in inflation. Another is that by anchoring market expectations around a demand path rather than an inflation path the business cycle should be substantially attenuated. And another is that a focus on NGDP makes for better management of supply shocks, since it implies looser policy, relative to an inflation target, when the economy is already being hit by a negative supply shock (rather than a tighter policy which would amplify the blow of the supply shock), and tighter policy when the economy is enjoying a positive productivity shock, which could conceivably prevent economic exuberance from taking a turn toward the irrational. The upshot of a switch to NGDP targeting at the present moment would be much more expansionary policy; the central bank would focus on targeting the obvious shortfall in demand and ignore the misfiring inflation signal.

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