3000字翻译成英文

篇一：3000字英文翻译

Bolt Supporting of Large-Span Soft Rockway in

Shaqu Colliery

Abstract The instability of trapezoidal I-steel support is analysed for the compound roof of main coal seam in Shaqu Colliery, and the mechanism of bolt supporting is studied. A scheme of bolt supporting has been given and put into practice,remarkable technical and economic benefits have been got.

Key words :large-span,compound roof, bolt supporting, mechanism

1.Introduction

In shaqu colliery a large coal mine mining rare coking coal in China, most roadways are laid out in main coal seam

roof of coal seam .The soft compound ,which is composed of mudstone and coal seam

contains aboundant beddings and joints. The strength of the roof is so low that its uniaxial-saturated compressive strength is only 10.7 Mpa.RQD value of coal seam and is zero ,and that of mudstone is lower than 10%. There is clay minerals in mudstone, main compositions are interbedded strata of illite and montmorillonite which will swell when soaked by water, The span of preperation roadways and gateways is wider than 4m, and that of some main roadways is over 5m. In shaqu colliery , preperation roadways and gateways were supported by trapezoidal I-steel support, the beams of which were bent and damaged, and the roadways were destroyed seriously within a short period just after excavated. Roof

controlling of Large-Span Soft Rockways in the coal seam became the key to the production and construction of shaqu colliery.

2.supporting status and instability analysis of trapezoidal I-steel supports

trapezoidal I-steel supports were used in drawing roadways,which roof span is 4.0m, floor span is 4.9m, and hight 2.95m and spacing 0.5m. Initial resistance of the supports was almost zero because it was difficult to the support beams contact the roof, even if with high quality of installation. The trapezoidal I-steel supports would not carry load until the displacement of surrounding rock excceded 80-100 mm because the supports increased very slowly. Therefore, right after excavation, the roof would bend and subside severly. Eight hours after excavation, the roof strata would break completely, and then form rock cavity. The weight of caving rock would act on the beams of supports, which forms loose rock pressure.

By calculating, the ultimate load-bearing capacity is smaller than roof pressure whether it is uniformal or concentrated, Based on the in-situ observation, inflection value of most roof reached 200-300mm. When paired supports were used, paired beams were still bent and damaged; then midprops were added, they were also destroyed. Many roof beams were stabilized only if 2-3 props had been added. The supports were damaged completely, and most of them could not be reused. The part

section of roadways had become inverted trapezoid, and the available section was far smaller than the designed section. Part of roadways was out of use because it was in the danger of serious caving.

3.Mechanism of bolt supporting

Its mechanism is to make full use of the self-load-bearing capacity of surrounding rock by bolting, and then make the surrounding rock stabilize by itself. The stability of surrounding rock depends on the equilibrium status of ground pressure, self-load-bearing capacity of surrounding rock and anchoring force of bolts. Ground pressure is to make surrounding rock deform and break; self-load-bearing capacity is the main factor to stablize surrounding rock. Anchoring force of bolts can not change the equilibrium status of the three because it is very small, compared with ground pressure and self-load-bearing capacity. And its function is to change the decreasing regularity of self-load-bearing capacity versus the deformation of surrounding rock, and balance self-load-bearing capacity against ground pressure early.

Roof pressure is the pressure acting on the roof beams when I-steel supports are used to control the roof. When roof is supported by bolts, the roof pressure change to be the pressure acting on the rock within the bolting range because this part of rock is change into self-bearing body. According to the characteristics of the roof of coal seams

can be divided into six substrata. , bolts strata

When the value of roof subsidence is zero, roof pressure is in-situ stress; then roof pressure decreases with the increase of roof subsidence. The variation of roof pressure is analyzed by FLAC, The results are shown as curve 1 in Fig.1. Wheoof subsidence reaches 19 mm, the first roof substratum begins to bearing tensile stress, then losts self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to 0.67Mpa. When roof subsidence reaches 40 mm, the second substratum loses self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to 0.16Mpa. When roof subsidence reaches 100 mm, the fourth substratum loses self-load-bearing capacity, and roof pressure decreases to0.08Mpa. In the initial stage of roof subsidence, roof pressure decreases rapidly, and in the later stage of roof subsidence, roof pressure decreases slowly and then has an increasing trend.

The self-load-bearing capacity of the roof without bolting is calculated upon the theory of laminated beam, the result are shown as curve 2 in Fig.1. When roof subsidence is zero, the self-load-bearing capacity is at its utmost value 0.0625Mpa; when roof subsidence is 100mm,roof strata have broken, most of self-load-bearing capacity has lost, and the residual self-load-bearing capacity is only 0.0375Mpa.The self-load-bearing capacity of the roof with bolting is calculated upon the theory of combined beam, the result are shown as curve 3 in Fig.1. When roof subsidence is zero, the self-load-bearing capacity is at its utmost

value 0.4Mpa; when the roof subsidence reaches 40mm the self-load-bearing capacity decreases to 0.225Mpa,and when roof subsidence reaches 100mm, the self-load-bearing capacity decreases to 0.1Mpa .

As shown in Fin. 1, the self-load-bearing capacity of roof strata without bolting is lower than roof pressure during the whole course of roof subsiding, so roof strata cave inevitably. When bolted, roof strata is changed from laminated beam into combined beam ,and the selr-load-bearing capacity increases markedly. When roof subsidence reaches 44mm, the self-load-bearing capacity exceeds roof pressure, then roof strata stabilized by itself.

4 Anchoring technology

Based on the above study of bolting mechanism, large setting resistance, high speed of resistance and high final resistance are the key technology to the large-spon soft rock roadway before roof strata detaching, which includes: (1)to improve the setting resistance increasing and achieve high speed of resistance increasing, to make the real working properties of bolts coordinate self-load-bearing properties of roof strata , which enables to make full use of the self-load-bearing capacity of roof strata; (2)to raise bolting reliability, and solve the difficult problems that anchoring force between bolts and soft rock is small and easy to lose.

4.1 Bloting scheme

篇二：3000字翻译

Monetary policy

An unfinished revolution

Aug 9th 2013, 12:53 by R.A. | LONDON

PROGRESS in the practice of monetary policy occurs one disaster at a time. From the depression of the 1930s economists learned that money matters, and that a contraction in the money supply can produce a painful downturn. From the inflation of the 1970s economists learned that inflation is a monetary phenomenon which can be controlled through the proper application of monetary policy. One has the sense that altough the world's present disaster is coming—slowly, fitfully—to an end, central bankers are still quite a long way away from understanding how they failed and how they might do better in the future. The most recent moves from the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve suggest that this particular revolution remains unfinished.

Monetary lessons are never learned quickly—unfortunately, since an earlier understanding of the nature of the disasters might allow policymakers to change course more quickly and prevent a lot of human suffering. Governments began experimenting with reinflation in 1932-33, touching off a proper recovery after four long years of depression, but America blundered back into recession in 1937 after tightening monetary policy once again. Only when monetary policy was entirely subordinated to the war effort was the depression well and truly beaten. And only in the decades after the war would economists begin articulating the connection between monetary contraction, deflation, and depression; Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's "Monetary History of the United States" was not published until 1963.

Inflation began its long march upwards in the mid-1960s and raged in double digits, across the rich world, for much of the 1970s. Not until the early 1980s did governments begin wringing inflation out of the system through monetary tightening. In that case, the intellectual heavy lifting preceded the policy experimentation. Monetarists and rational expectations theorists had ready explanations for galloping inflation, but central bankers took convincing that hammering economies with tighter policy would make a difference. The world's most recent economic disaster began in the late 1990s, when the Japanese economy fell into a liquidity trap and embarked on its lost decade. Economists quickly set to work diagnosing the Japanese economy and building policy recommendations. But arguments over just what Japan's crisis meant were uesolved when a Japan-like disaster descended on much of the rest of the rich world. And central banks have only gingerly and belatedly begun trying out ideas meant to bring the crisis to a quick and definitive end.

The rich world's disaster hinges on the problem of zero, in two ways. First, as the interest rates under the control of the central bank approach zero, policymakers are at a loss as to how to continue loosening policy. And second, when inflation approaches zero the

relationship between economic weakness and disinflation breaks down. When inflation is high a surge in unemployment will quickly slow price increases, but when inflation is low wage and price rigidities blunt the effect of unemployment, leaving inflation targeting central banks uncertain how to proceed.

These puzzles provoked an ongoing debate. In one corner stands a group with a long and proud history: those ready to give up on monetary policy. Some have been in the corner since rates first touched zero in 2008 while others have joined over time as unconventional policies failed to bring back full employment. But like those who said monetary policy couldn't fix the depression or rein in inflation, this bunch reckons that zero means it's time for other strategies, or to simply accept present suffering.

In another corner there are the mechanics, who reckon central banks have their framework right and only need to find new tools. If inflation falls dangerously below target while the main policy rate is near zero, then one should simply target longer rates and bring them down to zero. If even more oomph is needed, then the central bank can turn to rates on private (rather than government) loans and securities, and drive them down to zero. This group won the day in Japan, where the central bank debuted "quantitative easing" in the early 2000s. It held the early edge elsewhere in the rich world in the aftermath of the Great Recession; both the Fed and the Bank of England reached for 量化宽松政策 after their benchmark rates dropped to near zero.

Then there are those who emphasise expectations. It is not a controversial statement in central banking to note that the stance of monetary policy is determined by expectations of how a central bank will react to changing economic circumstances. But that of course implies that by telling markets about what sorts of things will trigger rate increases in the future, a central bank can tighten or loosen monetary policy in the present, all without adjusting any inerest rates. So if markets are behaving—that is, saving, borrowing, and investing—as if the central bank is likely to start tightening when x, y, and z thresholds are crossed, and the central bank then says to markets that it is actually prepared to allow expansion beyond those thresholds before raising rates, then markets should change their behaviour immediately.

This bunch has been ascendent over the past two years. Beginning in 2011 Federal Reserve policy statements included an approximate calendar date on which interest rates would begin to rise; in August of 2011 rates were said to be likely to stay low until at least mid-2013. For the next year the Fed adjusted its calendar guidance in response to economic conditions. Then in December of last year it switched things up, changing its guidance to revolve around economic variables, namely, the level of unemployment and inflation. Rates would stay low, the Fed said, until the unemployment rate had fallen to at least 6.5%, provided that inflation expectations were no more than half a percentage point above the Fed's 2% target. Fed officials have since indicated that ongoing 量化宽松政策 will also be pegged to particular changes in the economy, timed to end as the unemployment rate falls to 7%. This week the Bank of England embraced a similar approach. The Bank's main policy rate will not rise and 量化宽松政策 will continue until

the unemployment rate has fallen to at least 7%, provided that inflation two years ahead is not expected to be more than half a percentage point above 2% and the financial system is not judged to be tilting toward instability.

The expectations crowd seems to have gained an edge among policymakers for a few different reasons. First, central bank assessments of the risk-return profile of 量化宽松政策 seem to have been worsening. Central bankers never seemed particularly comfortable splashing out on government bonds, but appear to have been less than impressed with the results of their purchases and sick of hearing complaints about unpleasant 量化宽松政策 side effects (real and imagined), from financial-system distortions to looming hyperinflation. Some may also have worried that in the absence of clear communication about future policy 量化宽松政策's effects were being blunted. Markets might react to expansionary 量化宽松政策 by simply moving forward the date on which they expected policy tightening, thereby cancelling out the good done by the asset purchases. Better expectations management could help secure some of the 量化宽松政策 gains. And lastly, the thresholds approached has given hawkish central bankers an exit strategy to cling to: a sense that all the largesse will end, and perhaps in the not-too-distant future.

But the Fed has been tinkering with expectations management for a while now without generating the rapid recovery one would hope for from appropriate monetary policy. While the Bank of England approved of the Fed's innovations enough to adopt them for its own, Governor Mark Carney seemed to go out of his way to warn not to expect too much from the new guidance.

And yet the sun has yet to shine on those lingering in the last corner, who suggest that maybe there is something slightly more fundamental amiss with the current monetary policy approach: namely, that it still has a 2% inflation target at its heart.

That a 2% inflation goal might be a major culprit in the rich world's current economic mess is a hard thing to stomach for economists and policymakers who came of age in the 1970s. Yet there are good reasons for fingering the 2% rate as a real problem. Troubles began before the crisis, as the near-total absence of inflation pressure helped usher interest rates steadily downward, leaving much less breathing space between the Fed's policy rate and the dread zero. The Fed's main policy rate was just 4.25% when the recession began, giving the central bank little room to cut rates to battle the downturn. Economists have had to raise their estimates of just how often an economy will end up stuck with interest rates near zero when central banks target low rates of inflation.

A second difficulty emerged soon after: low and stable inflation translates into very rigid wages and prices, even in the face of big declines in demand and soaring unemployment. When the variability of inflation drops (as it did, dramatically, from the early 1980s on) workers and firms get in the habit of adjusting prices less frequently, they drop automatic wage indexing, and they generally increase the rigidity of the economy-wide price level. This rigidity is especially problematic at near-zero inflation rates given resistance to accepting absolute cuts in wages and prices. As a result even the epic economic collapse of late 2008 and early 2009 translated into relatively moderate and delayed disinflation.

And that meant big trouble for economies in which central banks used deflation as their depression canary-in-a-coal-mine. Prior to the crisis many central bankers would have insisted that there could be no demand collapse if inflation were kept above 1% and that keeping inflation above 1% would be sufficient to prevent a demand collapse. But they were wrong.

And though the link between sufficient demand and stable inflation would seem to have been called into question, central bankers have yet to update their mental models accordingly. They have evolved a bit. As the shift toward dual thresholds, including unemployment as well as inflation, indicates, central bankers are recognising that there is information out there about demand than is contained in the inflation rate. And yet their evolution is incomplete, because they insist on targeting a higher level of demand subject to continued fidelity to the inflation target. They have given themselves a bit of wiggle room by saying they will tolerate expected inflation a shade above 2%. But what they have manifestly not done is declare that they want more demand, whether or not that happens to involve inflation sustained above 2%.

Within the pre-crisis policy paradigm that view makes perfect sense. Rising inflation, in that worldview, is a sign that the economy is approaching its structural limits: is growing as fast as it potentially can. Goosing demand over and above that level is worse than useless; any growth that results is unsustainable and will fuel accelerating inflation.

But the crisis ought to have led central bankers to reconsider this view. For one thing, as noted above, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is not as clear as one would think at very low inflation rates. Study after study, including many produced by Fed economists, indicates that most of the gap between the current unemployment rate and the "normal" level is temporary—there really is quite a lot of labour-market slack—and yet inflation is not much below target. If inflation is less informative about slack than it used to be, then a central bank interested in getting rid of slack should probably discount the inflation signal to some extent.

Or to put things somewhat differently, an inflation rate of 3% or 4% is not in and of itself dangerous. It could be worrisome if it seemed to signal an economy being pushed beyond its capacity. But if there is good reason to believe that the economy is not close to capacity, then there is no particular reason to fear 3% inflation or 4% inflation. Inflation accelerating from 3% through 4% and beyond yes, but of all the problems rich economies have had over the past half decade turning a rising inflation rate to a falling one has not been among them.

It is worth acknowledging that there can be costs to a high but stable rate of inflation relative to a low but stable rate. If some prices adjust less quickly or easily than others, then a higher rate of inflation may entail greater distortions in relative prices that entail some efficiency costs. Such things need to be kept in perspective, however. The American economy, for instance, has been operating with an output gap close to $1 trillion for half a decade now. Even if that estimate is wildly overstated, and the actual gap is closer to $200 billion or 1.3% of GDP, that cost probably swamps any damage from relative-price

distortions.

Neither is the relationship between slack and inflation the only thing to consider. With interest rates near zero it may be very difficult to raise demand without lifting inflation expectations above the 2% rate. Normal monetary policy operates on the principle that there is a "market clearing" real interest rate (or set of real market rates), that balances desired saving and desired borrowing and prevents resources—or willing workers—from sitting around idle. The central bank's normal goal, then, is to adjust its policy rate to nudge market rates toward that market-clearing level. But what if the market-clearing real policy rate is -3% and the actual policy rate is stuck at 0.5% while inflation is just 1.5%? In that case the central bank's policy rate is way too high, and will remain way too high until either the market-clearing rate moves back toward positive territory or the central bank makes up its mind to lift inflation expectations. With an expected inflation rate of 3.5% the real policy rate drops to the appropriate level and the economy should leap in response. But that may seem an unlikely story. Or one could simply wonder about the underlying health of an economy in which investors can't find any attractive positive-return investments and must be cajoled into splashing out by the threat of inflation-driven loss of principal. The simpler way to conceptualise the current situation may simply be to conclude that inflation isn't as meaningful a concept as we thought. If we're interested in demand, and the reason we're interested in demand is that too much of it causes accelerating price increases and too little of it causes unnecessary joblessness, and we're pretty certain that there is too little demand despite the fact that the our traditional metric for assessing demand is signalling that all is well...well, perhaps that traditional metric isn't useful anymore, at least not for assessing demand.

One would then need an alternative metric, which of course takes us to the nominal output brigade. Nominal GDP, or total spending or income in the economy in dollar terms, has long been one of the gauges on the central banker's dashboard. It is hard to think of a better measure of economy-wide demand than the total amount of money spent each year in dollar terms. Supporters of an NGDP target (either a rate of growth or a trend level) point to several advantages. One, which should be clear already, is that there is little risk of monetary policy fumbling situations like the present in which demand swings are not entirely reflected in changes in inflation. Another is that by anchoring market expectations around a demand path rather than an inflation path the business cycle should be substantially attenuated. And another is that a focus on NGDP makes for better management of supply shocks, since it implies looser policy, relative to an inflation target, when the economy is already being hit by a negative supply shock (rather than a tighter policy which would amplify the blow of the supply shock), and tighter policy when the economy is enjoying a positive productivity shock, which could conceivably prevent economic exuberance from taking a turn toward the irrational. The upshot of a switch to NGDP targeting at the present moment would be much more expansionary policy; the central bank would focus on targeting the obvious shortfall in demand and ignore the misfiring inflation signal.

篇三：外语翻译3000字

应用性高校中全面型外语翻译人才培养模式的探索与构建

摘要：21世纪以来，中国经济开始走向多元化，世界各国之间交流合作增多，对于人才的要求也走向多元全面，尤其是对于外语翻译人才的需求不再是简单的对话翻译，社会经济和科学技术的发展对教育也提出了新的挑战，作为应用型高校，其人才的培养应该是以实用和实践为主，本文从外语翻译人才培养的现状入手，找到目前存在于外语翻译教学中的问题并提出对策，对于全面型外语翻译人才培养模式的构建进行探索，力求完善我国的外语翻译人才培养模式，并推动其发展。

关键词：全面型，外语翻译人才，应用型高校

一．前言

全球一体化的趋势使得国家之间的界限越来越模糊，国与国之间的文化交流与日俱增，对于外语人才的要求也逐渐走向多元化，外语翻译人才的培养成为了当务之急，而外语翻译作为专业性的人才培养课程，也必须进行改革，为了达到良好的教学效果，外语翻译人才的培养模式应该增强实用性，突破固有的翻译教学理念，加强实践在外语翻译人才培养过程中的参与度。人才是为了社会培养的，必须符合社会需求，而以往的外语翻译教学将太多精力投注在基础知识的传授上，此外外语中英语的高普及度为外语专业学生的就业增添了难度，以上因素的结合为高校外语翻译专业的发展提出了严峻的考验，同时对于传统的外语翻译人才培养模式表示了部分否定，翻译作为外语教学中的重难点，同时也是语言学科属下的一门学科，没有得到应有的重视，将这一门学科置于一个尴尬的境地，因此难以培养出全面型的外语翻译人才，由此可知，外语翻译人才培养模式的改革迫在眉睫，应该立即采取措施。

二．外语翻译人才培养的现状与问题

2.1外语翻译人才培养的现状

翻译是外语专业学生的必修课程，但是长久以来一直是外语教学的“短板”，作为语言科下级的一级学科，外语翻译并没有得到足够的关注，尤其对于应用型高校的学生来说，其外语实际综合应用能力是十分重要且必要的，主要表现在听说读写译五大能力上，“译”不仅是单独的翻译能力，更是其他能力的基础，但是目前高校外语翻译教学的现状是翻译作为一种辅助教学手段排在末位，相应的课时不够，课堂质量不高等问题长时间存在，尤其目前传统教学模式仍然处于主流位置，课堂成为老师的“独角戏”，学生得不到实践的机会和时间，传统的翻译教学还是在教学生如何做到“信达雅”，而当今社会的变化，要求翻译教学不只是简单的翻译技巧和知识的传授，而是多元化个性化翻译能力的培养，因此在应用性高校中，翻译人才的培养应该以翻译能力的提升尤其是实用性翻译技能的增强为主。

2.2外语翻译人才培养过程中遇到的问题

首先，学生对于翻译的认识只是简单的单词之间互换和句法的运用，这样的认识是十分狭隘的，因为翻译的完成是一个特定的语境中，不同的语境下每一个单词和句子都有自己特殊的涵义，需要用不同的理解方式和方法进行翻译。在目前翻译教学中经常会出现生搬硬套的现象，就是因为学生对于文章的背景不了解，导致其弄巧成拙。

第二，翻译理论的适当选择，翻译不同于其他学科，实在两种文化中寻找桥

梁，因此要在一定的理论指导下进行，如何选择适合的理论进行翻译指导，目前仍然需要学界人士商榷，适合的理论将会推动翻译教学的改革和发展，提升外语翻译教学的地位和教学质量。

三．全面型外语翻译人才培养模式探析

3.1全面型外语翻译人才的内涵及培养理论依据

随着社会生活的开放程度越来越大，中外各国之间经济文化政治的交流逐日增强，对于翻译人才的需求从质量和数量两个方面来看都产生了一定的变化。应用性高校以适应社会人才需求为目标，注重人才实践性的培养，与一般的高校在人才培养上有一定差别，一般高校注重学生科研能力的提升，而应用性高校就是将学到的知识和技能在工作中应用，因此应用性高校在培养外语翻译人才时，应该注意学生不仅是熟练掌握一门外语的语言知识，还应该掌握本专业的基础，具备优良的跨文化交流技能，并且视野宏阔，在实际应用中不断进行创新和调整，以求翻译的“信达雅”和“真善美”，基础的外语翻译技能以及丰富知识的存储和超越文化差别的交际能力是一种全面的人才要求，而应用性高校就是要以此为目标，进行完语翻译人才的培养。

全面型外语翻译人才的培养是一个以培养专业实用人才为目的的教学过程，这个过程不是静态的，而是动态的全方位多角度多层次的，主要是为了完成学生知识内化以及翻译技能的逐步提升，这一过程主要依据了建构主义学习理论，这一理论认为学习不再是老师单方面传授的过程，而是学生在一定的情境中完成知识的获取和内化，外语翻译作为一种情景化很强的学科，在传统的教学中丢失了自身的特性，因此全面型外语翻译人才培养模式中体现出了建构主义学习理论，表现在学习目标的树立上、知识体系的建构上、自我学习的主动上、知识获取的社会性上以及学习过程的情景化上。

3.2全面型外语翻译人才培养的方向

人才的培养是为了满足社会的需求，依据目前社会对于外语翻译人才的要求，全面型外语翻译人才培养模式下人才的培养应该做到以下四点。

第一，两种语言能力的全面。可以从比较分析的角度入手，对于语言之间的相似与差异进行各个层面的分析，并且在不同的语境中，灵活应用语言交际能力，对翻译内容进行阐释，并适当的表达出来。

第二，自身知识框架的建构。学生作为学习的主体，通过网络技术或者其他媒体的途径获取知识并且进行规划，建构适合自身并且属于自己的知识框架，并且借助现代科技手段以及辅助的工具，例如翻译系统等，解决自己在翻译过程中遇到的问题。

第三，建构自我评价机制。翻译是实践性极强的学科，在书本知识获取之后应该在实践中进行检验和应用，在实践过程中还应该建立完善的自我评价机制，建立自身的翻译技能和翻译策略，在翻译过程中评价自己，在评价过程中反思自己，在主观的反应时间中逐渐形成客观的翻译理论，将感性的知识内化为理性的认知。

第四，形成团队意识，建立合作精神。在翻译过程中进行自我的分析，从而达到与其他成员的协作，实现翻译优势的集合与互补，提升翻译的质量和效率。

3.3全面型外语翻译人才培养的要求

外语翻译人才培养模式是一个动态的过程，在这一过程中，除了学习者自身的因素，还有客观的翻译教学因素，应用性高校注重对翻译实践的应用，因此客观来看，全面型外语翻译人才的培养具有三个特点。

第一，教学材料的选择。不同于以往脱离实际的教材选择，翻译教材应该具备真实情境性、多元内涵行以及知识结构稳定性，实现高校培养的人才与社会需求的人才无缝对接的目标，充分达到人力资源的不浪费。

第二，教学方法的改善。教学方法应该根据人才培养目标进行改善，从而制定适合的教学计划和适应于每一位学生的个性化的学习方案，这一切的设计都是站在翻译的立足点之上，就是为了提升学生自主学习和主动探究的兴趣以及能力。

第三，师资力量的利用。这里的“师”不再局限于老师，而是校内教师+外教+企业的师资资源，让教师之间能够取长补短，为翻译人才的培养提供全方位的支持，在实践中提升学习者的翻译能力。

四．结语

外语翻译人才的紧缺需要外语翻译教学的改革来缓解，而全面型外语翻译人才模式的构建强调学生在一个动态的过程中进行翻译能力的获取，与外语翻译的实践性强的特征相吻合，因此在以后的外语翻译教学中值得大力推广，借此提升我国翻译人才的水平，促进经济发展和社会进步。

参考文献：

[1]林克难.翻译教学在国外[J].中国翻译,2000(2).

[2]黄立波,王克非.翻译普遍性研究反思[J].中国翻译,2006(5).

[3]石云龙.新形势下英语人才培养模式思考[J].江苏高教,2007(2).

[4]杜瑞清.复合型外语人才的培养与实践[J].外语教学,1997(2).

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