篇一：3000英语词组
妙语速记3000英文单词
---近形编句速记法速成3000常用英语单词
(缩略精华版)
刘伊翰编著
（购买办法：新华发行集团各大书店有售，定价12元/本；羊城晚报出版社或作者均可邮购，加15%邮费）
前 言
中国加入wto了!英语作为人们谋生发展的工具越发显得重要起来，甚至有人把文盲的范畴扩大到不懂外语的人，很多人都希望精通英语以为自己的生存和发展创造优势，然而，缺乏充足的时间和精力，缺少真正高效实用的学习方法和辅助工具，以低效乏味的记忆方式，面对数以万计的英语词汇和惊人的遗忘速度，这是一场多么没有希望的战斗，多少人经过长年累月的争扎，不得不退出了战场??
如果您曾大规模记忆英语单词，您一定会发现，有很多英文单词的词义完全不同，但拼写方式却十分相似，例如“doe、foe、joe、hoe、roe、toe、woe”等等，这些词在拼写方面相互之间只相差一个字母，但词义完全不同，人们很容易把这些词混淆弄错，尤其是那些字母数不多的短词，由于这些短词音节不明显并且很多读音相近，所以语音法难以凑效；又由于这些短词的拼写结构简单缺乏内部字根构造，所以构词法对这些词也是束手无策，因而字母数少的短词更令人烦恼。究竟有没有一种方法，能够有效避免常见短词的混淆并且能够有效提高对这些短词的记忆效率？答案是有的，笔者通过多年的研究，并运作电子计算机数据库技术对大量基础词汇进行了数亿次的词词比效运算，创造了一种实用有效的记忆方法，能够非常有效地解决上述的问题。
笔者把大量拼写只差一个字母的词汇集中在一起编成一个个记忆小组，并利用组内词汇的不同词义编成有意义的句子进行记忆，这种方法不仅能够有效避免混淆，而且大大提高了记忆的效率并加强了记忆的牢固度，例如把“doe、foe、joe、hoe、roe、toe、woe”编成“悲衷的乔锄了敌人的脚趾头得到了母鹿和鱼子”，这样您不是很容易便永远记住了这七个词了吗，本书正是基于这种思想，通过对18000多条英语基本单词进行了比对分析，完成了对大量近形易混词的编组和编句工作，力图让广大读者分享一种能够举一反三、事半功倍地牢记大量的基本单词的速记法。全书共编句800多条，收集近形英文单词3000多词。
由于本书涉及的词汇量较多，资料量大，虽然经过反复校阅和更正，但仍难免有所误差，如发现有疏漏恳请读者见谅和指正。
使用说明
一、联想助记原理
记忆心理学告诉我们，孤立地记忆一件事物，是很易遗忘的，只有将未曾记忆的新对象与已熟悉的旧对象建立起紧密的联系，才能用最少的代价最牢固地记住新的记忆内容。
二、压缩还原原理
在熟记一词的基础上，将其拼写相近的词汇归在一起，找出不同之处，只记忆该词及其各关联词的相互不同之处，即可以较少的脑力记忆较多的词量，而当需要时则以相反的规则唤起相近词汇的记忆，这就是本书的所谓记忆的“压缩”和“还原”。
运用“压缩/还原”的方法记忆单词，不仅可以大大减轻记忆负担，而且由于词与词之间建立了丰富的相互联系，可以互相加强记忆，还能够从多路径呼醒记忆内容。
例如，熟记了“doe”一词后，即可联系记忆“foe,hoe,joe,toe,roe,woe...”等一系拼写格
式为“?oe”片段的词，只要记住“f,h,j,t,r,w...”等等差别，即记忆住了一大串关联词。
三、近形规则
本书中的所谓“近形”，是指一词与另一词有相同的字母数，而只有一到两个位置的字母不同，其他大部分字母排列位置、顺序都一样的现象，如果只有一个字母不同，则称为“一级近形词”，如此类推。
四、近形词编句记忆法原理
词与词之间存在相互“近形”关系，基于这种关系可以通过“联想助记”、“压缩还原”的手段，实现由一词联记一大批词的目的。
五、近形编句记忆法优点
1．操作简单，资料较实用；
2．规则性强，简单明了，便于比较、压缩、记忆及准确还原唤醒；
3．本书已对大部分常用词汇进行了“近形、衍生”处理，可供读者即时参巧使用，实为一条用最快速度记住大量英语基本词汇的捷径。
4．中国人背汉语的句子比起背英语单词容易得多，如果能够把一批批近形英文单词编成有意义的句子，则可化难为易，化繁为简，可大大提高记忆的效率和趣味性，试想一想，背熟800多个中文句子容易一些，还是背熟3000个英文单词容易一些？
六、本书的编排规则及书中的标志与符号说明
1．本书取词的来源：新版《小学英语》第一至第六册、《小学英语》第一至第四册、新版《初中英语》第一至第三册、《初中英语》第一至第六册、《高中英语》第一至第三册及选修词、《大学英语1至6级常用词组》、《新概念英语》第一至第四册、《许国璋英语》第一至第四册、《托福600分单词》、《gre字汇进阶》、《外贸英语》第一至第四册、《电脑专业英语》、《医学专业英语》第一至第三册、《词频统计词库》一级常用词、《词频统计词库》二级常用词、《词频统计词库》三级常用词、《词频统计词库》四级常用词、《词频统计词库》五级常用词、《袖珍英汉词典》补充词、《mba》入学考试词汇。
2．本书的词汇学习深度：本书的目的在于帮助人们快速记住准确的拼写和简明基本词义，达到快速入门的目的，而真正纯熟掌握每一个词则必须依靠大量“听、写、背、说、想”的综合运用训练，而不能寄望于短时突击记忆。
3．本书的编排规则
①不含“-”连结的复合词。
②全部近形词都分组一次列出，助记句排在最前面，列位排前二格，组内近形词随其后排列，列位后二格。
③本书的词条重复率极低。本书共收集英文词汇3100条，正文词条只有3967条，平均每词出现次数仅为1.28次，因此本书的内容是十分精练紧凑的。
七、插卡循环记忆法：
记忆生理学家发现，人类在记忆某些内容后，如果在遗忘前及时加以巩固，则再次遗忘所需的时间会大大延长，经过多次及时的巩固，即能实现近似永久的记忆。例如，十岁之后才移民国外的人，几十年后仍能使用母语；反之，如果不能在遗忘发生前及时加以巩固，则会完全忘记所记的内容，要复习时只好重新记忆，这样，所花费的时间会较及时巩固多得多，而效果则较前者差得多。
然而，一刀切的机械式复习循环，会令记忆者在熟词、易记词上浪费过多的时间，而对生词、难记词的记忆却不够火候；此外，在记忆词汇的同时，过多的操心某词该进行多少次循环，到第几次又该如些这般，则会分散记忆者的注意力，加重记忆者的心理负担；目前流行的一些循环记忆法要求记忆者按严格的时间和周期进行记忆，对于工作、生活节奏快的上班族和功课越来越多的学生族而言，要达到诸如此类的要求实在是一项负担。
快速记忆英语单词，除每次记忆运用“近形、编句”等联系记忆方法外，科学的循环巩固方法亦是十分重要的，本节简要介绍一种符合记忆生理规律，可有效提高记忆效率的循环方法———插卡循环记忆法。
㈠、插卡循环操作法：
1、假设将所有需记忆的单词制成小卡片，一面是英文拼写和音标，另一面则是中文词义，将所需记忆的卡片，按前面中文后面英文的方向前后相叠排成一列。
2、抽出最前面的卡片，看其中文词义后默写其英文拼写，背出其读音，再反过卡片，核对是否回答正确。
3、如果默写及读音正确，则将此卡片插入到卡片序列中适当的位置（如何为适当的位置请参照第4点），如果错了，则重新默记该词，然后将此卡片插入现时第二张卡片的后面，这样记忆了下一卡片后，之前曾记错的卡片又会再次呈现在记忆者面前。
无论正确与否，插入后即重复第2点的操作，面对下一卡片所载词条的记忆。
4、刚刚测验过的卡片，应跳后插入到卡片队伍中若干个卡片之后的位置中等待再出现，跳后的距离决定于该词条的熟练程度和您打算保持的练习速度，回答正确和熟练程度高的则跳后插入距离前面远一些的位置，之后其重复出现的频率就会较低；回答错和熟练程度低的词条，跳后插入到距前面较近的位置，则其重复出现的频率较高；
5、词条卡片无论答对多少次，均不可剔除或另置，各词将会因其熟练程度不同按不同的频率反复出现；对于自认为已“永久”记住的卡片，则可放在卡片排列的最后面，如果最后一个“永久”记住的卡片再次“浮”到最前面，则说明您已全部熟记了本批卡片的单词，这时，可以增加新卡片，记忆新的单词。
㈡、本循环操作方法的优点和缺点：
本循环的学习形式简便随意，学新词与温旧词同时融汇于每一次测验过程之中，每次使用不拘时间、不拘次数、不拘旧课新课，而又能自动保持学习的连贯性，令您随时能马上专心投入学习，紧贴顺应记忆的科学规律而不必分心于学习的周期、进度、复习等等问题，特别适用于平时细水长流坚持学习稳步积累大量词汇。
插卡循环法的最大缺点是使用者要花大量时间制作卡片，对于急于在短时间内突击快速提高英语词汇量的朋友是不利的，为此，笔者向读者朋友们推荐一种由笔者根据本记忆方法开发，并已获国家计算机软件版权的微电脑助记软件，就是本书附录简介的《状元英语》
（以下各页是正文部分）
?ay——“不！”凯说,“（不）可以支付干草的钱。”。白天（去）海湾的路上光线闪烁,有只快乐的松鸡在下蛋。
nay [nei] ad.<书>不仅如此,而且;n.拒绝,反对,投反对票;ad.<古>否,不。
kay [kei] n.凯（女子名）。
say [sei] v.说,讲,背诵,念,表示,比方说,假定;n.话语,想说的意见,发言权。
may [mei] aux.可能,也许,可以,祝,愿;n.(may)五月,能,可能。
pay [pei] n.薪水,工资;v.支付,交纳,给予,有利,值得,合算。
hay [hei] n.干草,黑河(位于英属哥伦比亚)。
day [dei] n.天,白天,日子,白昼。
bay [bei] n.海湾,狗吠声,绝路;vt.吠,使走投无路;vi.吠。
way [wei] n.路,行业,规模,情形;a.途中的;ad.远远地,大大地,非常。
ray [rei] n.光线,闪烁,微量;vi.射出光线,浮现;vt.放射,显出。
gay [^ei] a.快乐的,高兴的,轻快的,华美的,五光十色的。
jay [dvei] n.鸟,松鸡,碎嘴唠叨的人,傻瓜。
lay [lei] vt.放置,产(卵);vi.下蛋,打赌;n.位置,形势;a.世俗的,外行的;vbl.lie过去式。
?ap——戴着无边帽,伏在膝盖的地图上小睡,偶然有吵嚷声,像是斥责和攻击;缺口处的树液,如同水龙头流出的半流质食物。
cap [kap] n.帽子,军帽,(瓶)帽,(笔)帽;vt.戴帽子,盖在...顶上。
lap [lap] n.膝盖,舔声,重叠的部分;v.（使）重叠,围住,轻拍,舔食,泼溅,拍打。
map [map] n.地图,图;v.绘制地图。
nap [nap] n.(白天)小睡,打盹,细毛,孤注一掷;vi.小睡,疏忽。
hap [hap] n.偶然,机会,运气;vi.偶然发生。
yap [jap] vi.狂吠,吵嚷;n.狂吠声,废话,无赖。
rap [rap] n.叩击,轻拍,轻敲,斥责;vt.敲,拍,打,厉声说出,斥责,使着迷;vi.敲击,交谈。
zap [zap] v.攻击,打败;n.活力,意志,杀死,int.咝！
gap [^ap] n.缺口,裂口,间隙,缝隙,差距,隔阂。
sap [sap] n.树液,体液,活力,坑道,笨人,傻子;vt.使排出体液,逐渐侵蚀;vi.挖坑道。
tap [tap] n.轻打,活栓,水龙头;v.轻打,轻敲。
pap [pap] n.奶头,半流质食物,<美>政治上的偏护。
?ot——帆布床上一堆不会腐败的罐子,酒鬼觉得是无法合计的圆点,但依然尝到少量的热辣的芳香。
cot [kct] n.轻便小床,帆布床。
lot [lct] n.签,抽签,一堆,许多,命运,一块地,份额;vt.划分;vi.抽签,抓阄。
not [nct] ad.不。
rot [rct] v.(使)腐烂,(使)腐败;n.腐烂,腐败。
pot [pct] n.罐,壶;v.罐装。
sot [sct] n.醉鬼,酗酒者;vt.因酗酒浪而费掉;vi.嗜酒。
tot [tct] n.小孩,微量,合计;vi.总计,加算;vt.加起来,合计。
dot [dct] n.点,圆点,园点;vt.在...上打点。
got [^ct] vbl.get的过去式。
jot [dvct] n.少量,少额,稍许;vt.略记,摘要记载下来,草草地记下。
hot [hct] a.热的,热情的,辣的,激动的,紧迫的;ad.热,热切的,紧迫地。
?ad——这家伙是无赖,嗜好闲逛;悲哀的老爸变得疯狂,把他的练习簿撕作填料。
lad [lad] n.少年,小伙子,家伙,老友,伙伴。
cad [kad] n.计算机辅助设计,(小写)无赖。
fad [fad] n.反复无常,一时的流行,嗜好。
gad [^ad] vi.闲逛,找乐子;vt.用铁棒刺;n.游荡,錾,(赶牲畜用的)尖头棒。
sad [sad] a.忧愁的,悲哀的。
dad [dad] n.{口语}爸爸。
mad [mad] a.疯狂的,愚蠢的,狂欢的,非常激动的,狂热的,着迷的;n.狂怒。
wad [wcd] n.块状软物,填料;vt.把...卷为一卷，填塞,以软物衬填
?ar——在战争毁坏了的酒吧门前,水兵手里把着一罐平价的啤酒,耳朵留意着远方的车和小艇。
war [wc:] n.战争;vi.作战,打仗。
mar [mb:] v.弄坏,毁坏,损害;n.损伤,毁损,障碍;n.(mar)三月(=march)。
bar [bb:] n.条,棒(常用作栅栏,扣栓物),横木,酒吧间,栅,障碍物;vt.禁止,阻挡,妨碍。
tar [tb:] n.柏油,水兵,沥青,鸦片;v.涂以焦油。
jar [dvb:] n.震动,刺耳声,震惊,争吵,罐,广口瓶。
par [pb:] n.同等,(股票等)票面价值;a.票面的,平价的,平均的,标准的。
ear [ie] n.耳朵,倾听,听觉,听力,穗;vi.抽穗。
far [fb:] a.长途的,远方的,遥远的;ad.久远地,广泛地。
car [kb:] n.车。
oar [c:, ce] n.桨{手},小艇,桨状物,搅拌棍,橹桨;v.引渡。
?ow——在干草堆前,大母猪向母牛鞠躬请教,如何划船和拖行？母牛低声说：你此刻先立誓??。
mow [mbu] n.干草堆,谷堆;v.刈,割草,扫除,收割庄稼,扫倒。
sow [sbu] n.大母猪;vt.播种,散布,使密布;vi.播种。
cow [kbu] n.母牛,大型母兽;vt.威吓。
bow [bbu] n.弓,乐弓,弓形,鞠躬,船首;v.鞠躬,弯腰。
how [hbu] ad.如何,（指范围,程度,数量,价值）多少,多么;n.方式（或方法）。
row [rbu,reu] n.排,行;v.划(船)。
tow [teu] n.拖绳,麻的粗纤维;vt.拖,曳,牵引;vi.拖行,被拖带。
low [leu] n.低,低价,牛叫声;a.低的,浅的,消沉的;ad.低下地,谦卑地,低价地。
now [nbu] ad.现在,目前,此刻,立刻,马上;n.现在,如今;conj.既然。
vow [vbu] n.誓约;v.宣誓,立誓,发誓。
?et——我敢打赌,从网络上获得宠物,至今还办不到：只要设置好,适合多雨天的喷气机,也能出租！
bet [bet] n.赌注,打赌;v.赌,赌钱。
net [net] n.网,网络,网状物,净利,实价;a.净余的,纯粹的;vt.用网捕,净赚,得到;vi.编网。 get [^et] vt.获得,变成,收获,使得,挣得,受到(惩罚,打击等),染上,抓住;vi.到达,成为,变得。 pet [pet] n.宠物,受宠爱的人,不悦;a.宠爱的,亲昵的;vt.宠爱。
yet [jet] ad.仍,至今,益发,更;conj.然而,但是。
set [set] v.放,置,移动到,设置,提出,树立,规定,调整;n.一套,一副,一批,布景。
wet [wet] a.湿的,潮湿的,有雨的,多雨的;vt.弄湿。
jet [dvet] n.喷射,黑玉;v.喷射;a.黑玉色的,墨黑的,喷气机。
let [let] vt.假设,出租,允许,排放,让...进入(或通过),妨碍;vi.出租,(工程等)被承包。
?ut——半岛是大陆在海中的突出部分,但海峡是什么？把坚果切开,摆在小屋的外面,这是惯例。
jut [dvqt] v.(使)突出,(使)伸出,突击;n.突出部分,伸出部分。
but [bet, bqt] prep.除...以外;conj.而是,但是;ad.几乎,仅仅。
gut [^qt] n.{复}内脏,小肠,剧情,内容,海峡;vt.取出内脏,摧毁(房屋)内部装置。
nut [nqt] n.坚果,螺母,螺帽,难解的问题。
cut [kqt] v.切(割、削),(直线等)相交,剪,截,刺穿,刺痛,删节,开辟。
put [put] vt.放,摆,移动,提出,赋予;vi.出发,航行,发芽;n.掷,笨蛋,怪人f。
hut [hqt] n.小屋,棚屋。
out [but] a.外面的,出局的;ad.在外,明显地;n.外面,外出,外观;vt.赶出,击倒,。
rut [rqt] n.车辙,常轨,定例,惯例;v.在...形成车辙。
?ag——囚犯喋喋不休,谈论物价下跌,老马不再唠叨,口里被塞满了标签袋里的抹布。 wag [wa^] vt.摇摆,摇动,饶舌;vi.爱说笑打趣的人,摆动,喋喋不休;n.摇摆,小丑。
sag [sa^] v.松弛,下陷,下垂,(物价)下跌,漂流;n.下垂,下陷,物价下跌,随风漂流。
nag [na^] n.老马,驽马,劣等竞赛马,(作坐骑的)矮小马,唠叨;v.不断地唠叨,恼人。
gag [^a^] n.塞口物,箝制,讨论终结,张口器,说谎;vt.塞物于...的口中,使窒息。
tag [ta^] n.标签,鞋带、绳子等末端的金属物,垂下物;vt.加标签于,紧随,添饰。
篇二：3000字翻译
Monetary policy
An unfinished revolution
Aug 9th 2013, 12:53 by R.A. | LONDON
PROGRESS in the practice of monetary policy occurs one disaster at a time. From the depression of the 1930s economists learned that money matters, and that a contraction in the money supply can produce a painful downturn. From the inflation of the 1970s economists learned that inflation is a monetary phenomenon which can be controlled through the proper application of monetary policy. One has the sense that altough the world's present disaster is coming—slowly, fitfully—to an end, central bankers are still quite a long way away from understanding how they failed and how they might do better in the future. The most recent moves from the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve suggest that this particular revolution remains unfinished.
Monetary lessons are never learned quickly—unfortunately, since an earlier understanding of the nature of the disasters might allow policymakers to change course more quickly and prevent a lot of human suffering. Governments began experimenting with reinflation in 1932-33, touching off a proper recovery after four long years of depression, but America blundered back into recession in 1937 after tightening monetary policy once again. Only when monetary policy was entirely subordinated to the war effort was the depression well and truly beaten. And only in the decades after the war would economists begin articulating the connection between monetary contraction, deflation, and depression; Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's "Monetary History of the United States" was not published until 1963.
Inflation began its long march upwards in the mid-1960s and raged in double digits, across the rich world, for much of the 1970s. Not until the early 1980s did governments begin wringing inflation out of the system through monetary tightening. In that case, the intellectual heavy lifting preceded the policy experimentation. Monetarists and rational expectations theorists had ready explanations for galloping inflation, but central bankers took convincing that hammering economies with tighter policy would make a difference. The world's most recent economic disaster began in the late 1990s, when the Japanese economy fell into a liquidity trap and embarked on its lost decade. Economists quickly set to work diagnosing the Japanese economy and building policy recommendations. But arguments over just what Japan's crisis meant were uesolved when a Japan-like disaster descended on much of the rest of the rich world. And central banks have only gingerly and belatedly begun trying out ideas meant to bring the crisis to a quick and definitive end.
The rich world's disaster hinges on the problem of zero, in two ways. First, as the interest rates under the control of the central bank approach zero, policymakers are at a loss as to how to continue loosening policy. And second, when inflation approaches zero the
relationship between economic weakness and disinflation breaks down. When inflation is high a surge in unemployment will quickly slow price increases, but when inflation is low wage and price rigidities blunt the effect of unemployment, leaving inflation targeting central banks uncertain how to proceed.
These puzzles provoked an ongoing debate. In one corner stands a group with a long and proud history: those ready to give up on monetary policy. Some have been in the corner since rates first touched zero in 2008 while others have joined over time as unconventional policies failed to bring back full employment. But like those who said monetary policy couldn't fix the depression or rein in inflation, this bunch reckons that zero means it's time for other strategies, or to simply accept present suffering.
In another corner there are the mechanics, who reckon central banks have their framework right and only need to find new tools. If inflation falls dangerously below target while the main policy rate is near zero, then one should simply target longer rates and bring them down to zero. If even more oomph is needed, then the central bank can turn to rates on private (rather than government) loans and securities, and drive them down to zero. This group won the day in Japan, where the central bank debuted "quantitative easing" in the early 2000s. It held the early edge elsewhere in the rich world in the aftermath of the Great Recession; both the Fed and the Bank of England reached for 量化宽松政策 after their benchmark rates dropped to near zero.
Then there are those who emphasise expectations. It is not a controversial statement in central banking to note that the stance of monetary policy is determined by expectations of how a central bank will react to changing economic circumstances. But that of course implies that by telling markets about what sorts of things will trigger rate increases in the future, a central bank can tighten or loosen monetary policy in the present, all without adjusting any inerest rates. So if markets are behaving—that is, saving, borrowing, and investing—as if the central bank is likely to start tightening when x, y, and z thresholds are crossed, and the central bank then says to markets that it is actually prepared to allow expansion beyond those thresholds before raising rates, then markets should change their behaviour immediately.
This bunch has been ascendent over the past two years. Beginning in 2011 Federal Reserve policy statements included an approximate calendar date on which interest rates would begin to rise; in August of 2011 rates were said to be likely to stay low until at least mid-2013. For the next year the Fed adjusted its calendar guidance in response to economic conditions. Then in December of last year it switched things up, changing its guidance to revolve around economic variables, namely, the level of unemployment and inflation. Rates would stay low, the Fed said, until the unemployment rate had fallen to at least 6.5%, provided that inflation expectations were no more than half a percentage point above the Fed's 2% target. Fed officials have since indicated that ongoing 量化宽松政策 will also be pegged to particular changes in the economy, timed to end as the unemployment rate falls to 7%. This week the Bank of England embraced a similar approach. The Bank's main policy rate will not rise and 量化宽松政策 will continue until
the unemployment rate has fallen to at least 7%, provided that inflation two years ahead is not expected to be more than half a percentage point above 2% and the financial system is not judged to be tilting toward instability.
The expectations crowd seems to have gained an edge among policymakers for a few different reasons. First, central bank assessments of the risk-return profile of 量化宽松政策 seem to have been worsening. Central bankers never seemed particularly comfortable splashing out on government bonds, but appear to have been less than impressed with the results of their purchases and sick of hearing complaints about unpleasant 量化宽松政策 side effects (real and imagined), from financial-system distortions to looming hyperinflation. Some may also have worried that in the absence of clear communication about future policy 量化宽松政策's effects were being blunted. Markets might react to expansionary 量化宽松政策 by simply moving forward the date on which they expected policy tightening, thereby cancelling out the good done by the asset purchases. Better expectations management could help secure some of the 量化宽松政策 gains. And lastly, the thresholds approached has given hawkish central bankers an exit strategy to cling to: a sense that all the largesse will end, and perhaps in the not-too-distant future.
But the Fed has been tinkering with expectations management for a while now without generating the rapid recovery one would hope for from appropriate monetary policy. While the Bank of England approved of the Fed's innovations enough to adopt them for its own, Governor Mark Carney seemed to go out of his way to warn not to expect too much from the new guidance.
And yet the sun has yet to shine on those lingering in the last corner, who suggest that maybe there is something slightly more fundamental amiss with the current monetary policy approach: namely, that it still has a 2% inflation target at its heart.
That a 2% inflation goal might be a major culprit in the rich world's current economic mess is a hard thing to stomach for economists and policymakers who came of age in the 1970s. Yet there are good reasons for fingering the 2% rate as a real problem. Troubles began before the crisis, as the near-total absence of inflation pressure helped usher interest rates steadily downward, leaving much less breathing space between the Fed's policy rate and the dread zero. The Fed's main policy rate was just 4.25% when the recession began, giving the central bank little room to cut rates to battle the downturn. Economists have had to raise their estimates of just how often an economy will end up stuck with interest rates near zero when central banks target low rates of inflation.
A second difficulty emerged soon after: low and stable inflation translates into very rigid wages and prices, even in the face of big declines in demand and soaring unemployment. When the variability of inflation drops (as it did, dramatically, from the early 1980s on) workers and firms get in the habit of adjusting prices less frequently, they drop automatic wage indexing, and they generally increase the rigidity of the economy-wide price level. This rigidity is especially problematic at near-zero inflation rates given resistance to accepting absolute cuts in wages and prices. As a result even the epic economic collapse of late 2008 and early 2009 translated into relatively moderate and delayed disinflation.
And that meant big trouble for economies in which central banks used deflation as their depression canary-in-a-coal-mine. Prior to the crisis many central bankers would have insisted that there could be no demand collapse if inflation were kept above 1% and that keeping inflation above 1% would be sufficient to prevent a demand collapse. But they were wrong.
And though the link between sufficient demand and stable inflation would seem to have been called into question, central bankers have yet to update their mental models accordingly. They have evolved a bit. As the shift toward dual thresholds, including unemployment as well as inflation, indicates, central bankers are recognising that there is information out there about demand than is contained in the inflation rate. And yet their evolution is incomplete, because they insist on targeting a higher level of demand subject to continued fidelity to the inflation target. They have given themselves a bit of wiggle room by saying they will tolerate expected inflation a shade above 2%. But what they have manifestly not done is declare that they want more demand, whether or not that happens to involve inflation sustained above 2%.
Within the pre-crisis policy paradigm that view makes perfect sense. Rising inflation, in that worldview, is a sign that the economy is approaching its structural limits: is growing as fast as it potentially can. Goosing demand over and above that level is worse than useless; any growth that results is unsustainable and will fuel accelerating inflation.
But the crisis ought to have led central bankers to reconsider this view. For one thing, as noted above, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is not as clear as one would think at very low inflation rates. Study after study, including many produced by Fed economists, indicates that most of the gap between the current unemployment rate and the "normal" level is temporary—there really is quite a lot of labour-market slack—and yet inflation is not much below target. If inflation is less informative about slack than it used to be, then a central bank interested in getting rid of slack should probably discount the inflation signal to some extent.
Or to put things somewhat differently, an inflation rate of 3% or 4% is not in and of itself dangerous. It could be worrisome if it seemed to signal an economy being pushed beyond its capacity. But if there is good reason to believe that the economy is not close to capacity, then there is no particular reason to fear 3% inflation or 4% inflation. Inflation accelerating from 3% through 4% and beyond yes, but of all the problems rich economies have had over the past half decade turning a rising inflation rate to a falling one has not been among them.
It is worth acknowledging that there can be costs to a high but stable rate of inflation relative to a low but stable rate. If some prices adjust less quickly or easily than others, then a higher rate of inflation may entail greater distortions in relative prices that entail some efficiency costs. Such things need to be kept in perspective, however. The American economy, for instance, has been operating with an output gap close to $1 trillion for half a decade now. Even if that estimate is wildly overstated, and the actual gap is closer to $200 billion or 1.3% of GDP, that cost probably swamps any damage from relative-price
distortions.
Neither is the relationship between slack and inflation the only thing to consider. With interest rates near zero it may be very difficult to raise demand without lifting inflation expectations above the 2% rate. Normal monetary policy operates on the principle that there is a "market clearing" real interest rate (or set of real market rates), that balances desired saving and desired borrowing and prevents resources—or willing workers—from sitting around idle. The central bank's normal goal, then, is to adjust its policy rate to nudge market rates toward that market-clearing level. But what if the market-clearing real policy rate is -3% and the actual policy rate is stuck at 0.5% while inflation is just 1.5%? In that case the central bank's policy rate is way too high, and will remain way too high until either the market-clearing rate moves back toward positive territory or the central bank makes up its mind to lift inflation expectations. With an expected inflation rate of 3.5% the real policy rate drops to the appropriate level and the economy should leap in response. But that may seem an unlikely story. Or one could simply wonder about the underlying health of an economy in which investors can't find any attractive positive-return investments and must be cajoled into splashing out by the threat of inflation-driven loss of principal. The simpler way to conceptualise the current situation may simply be to conclude that inflation isn't as meaningful a concept as we thought. If we're interested in demand, and the reason we're interested in demand is that too much of it causes accelerating price increases and too little of it causes unnecessary joblessness, and we're pretty certain that there is too little demand despite the fact that the our traditional metric for assessing demand is signalling that all is well...well, perhaps that traditional metric isn't useful anymore, at least not for assessing demand.
One would then need an alternative metric, which of course takes us to the nominal output brigade. Nominal GDP, or total spending or income in the economy in dollar terms, has long been one of the gauges on the central banker's dashboard. It is hard to think of a better measure of economy-wide demand than the total amount of money spent each year in dollar terms. Supporters of an NGDP target (either a rate of growth or a trend level) point to several advantages. One, which should be clear already, is that there is little risk of monetary policy fumbling situations like the present in which demand swings are not entirely reflected in changes in inflation. Another is that by anchoring market expectations around a demand path rather than an inflation path the business cycle should be substantially attenuated. And another is that a focus on NGDP makes for better management of supply shocks, since it implies looser policy, relative to an inflation target, when the economy is already being hit by a negative supply shock (rather than a tighter policy which would amplify the blow of the supply shock), and tighter policy when the economy is enjoying a positive productivity shock, which could conceivably prevent economic exuberance from taking a turn toward the irrational. The upshot of a switch to NGDP targeting at the present moment would be much more expansionary policy; the central bank would focus on targeting the obvious shortfall in demand and ignore the misfiring inflation signal.
篇三：3000单词外文文献翻译范文
南京航空航天大学金城学院
毕业设计（论文）外文文献翻译
系 部
专 业
学生姓名
指导教师经济系 国际经济与贸易 学号 曹冬艳 职称 讲师
2014年 4 月
Research on the Agricultural Products Export in Shandong Province
under Green Trade Barriers
Chapter One Introduction
1.1 Research Background and significance of the Paper
Green trade barriers closely related to green trade protection, which provides the trade protector a new concept and had a huge impact on international trade. Although green trade barriers blocked the international trade to some extent, it actually aims to protect environment and human health. Green trade is a trend in the international trade and an irreversible one in the world market.
1.1.1 Research Background
As the world’s largest developing country, agriculture industry is the traditional industry in China and agricultural products have been the traditional ones for trade. And green trade barrier will have a far-reaching influence on China’s agricultural products export. Since China’s accession to the WTO in2001, China’s agricultural products export enterprises have been restricted not only by tariffs, quotas and other restrictions, but also suffer from the so-called “green requirements”, which led to difficulty in access to the world market. Under the WTO framework, more and more countries have adopted subtler, less transparent measures on their agricultural production and trade under green trade barriers, which makes it harder to monitor and predict. So China’s agricultural trade and overall economic development will face new challenges, thus how to cope with green trade barriers has become key issues for us.
1.1.2 Significance of the Paper
Agriculture in China has a long history. Early center of Agriculture has been identified in the Huang he (Yellow River) in China. Rice, millet, soybean, onion, and peach are among of the most important products originated in this region.
China has been a nation of farmers for over 4,000 years. When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, all arable land was under cultivation; agricultural infrastructure as irrigation and drainage systems constructed centuries earlier and intensive farming practices already produced relatively high yields (Library of Congress). Currently, even China’s cropland is only about 75 percent of the US(8). The main crops cultivated are rice, wheat, maize, cotton, soybeans and tobacco. Agricultural of China is important due to the size of population and economic development.
Since most of Chinese population is considered rural, agricultural activities is one of the main sources of employment in the country. Concerns about food security make the government put strong emphasis in production. In general terms, it must satisfy 21 percent of world’s population food needs with just 9 percent of world arable land.
Chapter two
2.1 Situation of Agricultural Products Export
Reform and trade liberalization in China’s external sector has proceeded progressively during last 20 years. Though this reform period, China’s trade regime has gradually changed form a highly centralized, planned and import substitution regime to a more decentralized, market-oriented and exports promotion one. These changes in trade and other policies have significantly affected the total and composition of China’s trade in favor of the products in which China has a comparative advantage. China tends to exports labor-intensive products such fruits,vegetables,fish and processed agricultural goods, which has been destined mainly to neighboring countries,especially Japan, Korea and others countries of Southeast Asia and also the USA and Europe.
Exports of agricultural products are an important source of foreign currency in China, however ,even the value of agricultural products exportation continue growing, its share as part of the total export value has diminished gradually over the years, from a share of 20% in 1998 to 6.3% in 2000(21). China continues being a major world player in exports of agricultural products. In 2001, export of garlic and mushrooms were above 40 percent of world exports, while export of silk reached a share of 81 percent (measured in value).
China exports a lot of vegetables, however not all in same big quantities. Garlic has been the main exported in this category with a quantity of 54.65 thousand Mt in 2001, and an average of 233 thousand Mt over the part 11 year period. Canned mushrooms and Dry onions reached averages of 171 and 103 thousand Mt each one during the same period. Other vegetables, also very important, that had big average exported quantities (in thousand Mt) are : cabbages (53.5), carrots (35.9), mushroom (35.5), watermelons (28.5), dried mushrooms (24.8), cauliflower (18.3), tomatoes (18.1), leeks (13.6), and green broad beans (11.6).
In the group of meat (23), chicken meat and pork has been the most important with an average export of 237.2 and 190.2 thousand Mt per year. Other types of meat that represent relative large
average quantities (thousand of Mt) per year are: meat preparation pigs (70) canned chicken meat (42.5), pig meat (35.3), beef and veal boneless (32.7), rabbit meat (21.7), and duck meat (15.8). In the cereal group, maize has been the most important product with an average exported quantity that surpassed 6.3 million Mt per year between 1991 to2001, and represented 73.1.% of average exported cereals. Rice has been also important, ever its quantity is not so large as maize, but it reached an average export of 1,6 million Mt each year, and a share of 19% of total cereals exports:both maize and rice together represented 92.1% of cereal exports. Other cereals less important in quantity are sorghum and buckwheat, and finally with even less quantity are wheat, triticale and millet.
Export of fibres were represented principally by cotton lint, which had an average of 115 thousand Mt per year, that is 55.9% of total fibres exports measured in quantity, but only 18.1% measured in value. Other products such cotton waste, scoured wool, raw and waste silk, and jute met average imported quantities of 16.6, 11.7, 10.9, and 9,7 thousand Mt respectively. With less quantity are other products like carded or comber hair, tow and waste of flax, ramie, ueliable cocoons and greasy wool. From the point of view of value, export were led by raw and waste silk, and carded or comber hair, with a participation of 30.9 and 26.8% respectively.
Spices exports were dominated by ginger, which in 2001 reach a record quantity of 177 thousand Mt Exports of pimento reached 84.8 thousand Mt in 2001 and an average of 50.6 thousand Mt per year while cinnamon surpassed slightly an average of 23.3 thousand Mt per year. Other products are anise peppers. In the stimulant group, even China exports green coffee and cocoa powder, quantities are relative small to compare with export of tea, which accounted average of 201.3 thousand Mt in the 11 years period. In the other crops group, cigarettes and tobacco leaves has lead the list with an average export quantity of 40.3 and 15.5 thousand Mt tons per years respectively. Other products are natural rubber-232, hops, and oil of citronella.
2.2 General Situation and The Trade of Export to Main Countries or Regions
2.2.1 General Situation of Export to Main Countries or Regions
According to the China’s Agricultural Yearbook of 1994, Chinese agricultural exports have reached more than 160 different countries and region region. Chinese agricultural exports are distributed all over the continents; however this distribution is not balanced. The average exports from 1994 to
2000 show that the Asian region was the main destination, concentrating 75.5% of total agricultural exports. The other regions have participated with different percentages: Europe 15.2%, North America 5.4%, Africa 2.3%, Latin America 1% and Oceania 0.6%.
In the Asia region, exports are also concentrated in three destinies: Japan (30.9%), Hong Kong (18.2%) and South Korea (6.7%); these three destinies together have signified an average percentage of 55.8% per year. Other countries in this region with an important participation are: Singapore (2.8%), Indonesia (2.6%), Malaysia (2.5%) and Philippines with 2.1%.
In Europe, the main buying countries have been Russia, Holland and Germany, each one with participation of 2.9, 2.7 and 3.1%.
In North America, exports have gone to the United States (4.7%) and Canada (0.6%). In Africa the main destinies are Cote d’Ivoire (0.3%), Morocco (0.3%) and South Africa (0.3%). In Latin America Cuba (0.3%) and Brazil (0.2 %), and finally in Oceania is Australia (0.5%).
China has had an important participation in several agricultural exports. Products with high share of world exports were ramie and raw and waste silk, with 91.9% and 87.7% in 2001. Both of these two products show increase in share between 1991 and 2001. When shares changed from 58.3% to 91.9% and from 72% to 87.7%, respectively.
2.2.2 The Trade of Export and import
In 1991, there were only 6 products its export share was above 50% of world exports: sweet potatoes, pork, raw and waste silk, ramie, ueelable cocoons and cake of cotton seed. In 2001 the number of products increased to 10 products; the new added products were buckwheat, oil of tung, hair (carded or combed), reelable cocoons, fresh or dried vegetables and ginger. At the same time some products decreased participation under 50%, as in the case of sweet potatoes, pork and cake of cottonseed.
Other products that had participation between 30% and 50% in 2001 were: cassava tapioca, mushrooms (dried and canned), hair of horses, garlic, groundnuts (prepared, shelled, and in shell), and oil of citronella.
In the group of products with share between 20% and 30% were: rabbit (meat and skins), wool shoddy, chestnuts, beeswax, canella, oil of sesame seeds, soya sauce, honey and dry beans. The rest of product had a share below 20%.
Total agricultural exports show an increasing tendency, according to data from Faostat, it increase in
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